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Valuation of shares can be divided into two broad categories: fiscal and 
ccmmercial. Fiscal valuations are required to help determine tax 
liabilities which can arise when shares change hands on death, by way of 
gift or by transfer at a non arm's length price. Fiscal valuations 
generally take place after the event and reflect the desire of the taxpayer, 
usually represented by a professional adviser, to minimise his tax 
liability. Fiscal valuations are rarely, if ever tested in the market place 
by the willingness or otherwise of persons to buy or sell at the valuation 
amount.
Ccnmercial valuations can be defined as all valuations of shares done other 
than for fiscal purposes. A coainercial valuation is implicit whenever 
shares are bought, sold or issued in arm's length transactions. It may be 
an open market valuation as between a willing buyer and a willing seller or 
it may be a valuation as between a particular buyer and seller.
Although difference exist between fiscal and commercial valuations, the 
former are based on the latter and most of the work required is common to 
both types of share valuation.
Share valuation has been a neglected study in this country. The reasons for 
this are not entirely clear since share valuations are being required for an 
increasing number of purposes - fiscal, legal and conmereial. Perhaps it is 
because the art of share valuation involves problems of law, economics, 
accountancy and conxnercial appraisal which go beyond the speciality of a 
single profession. This overlapping of disciplines makes it difficult to do 
justice to all the many and varied aspects of the subject.
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The characteristics of value
Value is almost impossible to define precisely. According to V.L. Gole, an 
Australian valuer, a thing may be said to be valuable if it has real worth. 
Real worth may be related to emotion, sentiment, tradition, market forces, 
scarcity, time and prospects. This echoes Ovens' and Beach's view that 
value '... is a psychological concept, a function of people's desires, 
nrinciples, attitudes and emotions'.
nr'he valuation of an asset is purely subjective. There is no such thing as 
objective truth in the assessment of value. Value is an infinitely fluid 
concept changing in time and varying from place to place and individual to 
individual.
Value is such a fundamental concept that it cannot be defined in terms of 
anything more elemental but we can obtain insights into the concept of value 
by a knowledge of how it is measured. Time, distance and temperature, for 
example, are all basically undefinable but can be measured by, respectively 
clocks, yardsticks and thermometers. Knowledge of, and familiarity with 
these techniques of measurement add to our understanding of the concepts 
themselves. Indeed, this knowledge of the means of measurement seems 
fundamental, and not merely peripheral, to our understanding of the 
concepts. It is as if the essence of basic concepts can never be defined 
but can best be described and understood by setting out their 
characteristics.
An important characteristic of value is the. , it is expressible in terms of a 
single lump sum of money considered as payable or expendable at a particular 
point in time in exchange for property. people acquire property for the
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future benefits which ownership will confer. The buyer of a house can 
occupy or let it, the purchaser of a book can read and enjoy it, the 
collector of antiques derives aesthetic satisfaction from his collection an£ 
the shareholder receives dividends on his shares. Thus property has to have 
sense use, or attraction, for it to have any value.
It might be thought that objects with the highest use would have the 
greatest value, but very often the reverse is the case. As Adam Smith 
observed, water and diamonds have values inversely proportional to their 
utility. This perverse situation arises because demand, which is a function 
of use, is only one side of the value equation; supply is the other. When 
the supply is plentiful value tends to be low, and when a carmodity is 
scarce its price tends to be high.
Fortunately, this inverse relationship of utility to value does not seem to 
hold for financial assets. Although financial assets themselves have no 
intrinsic use - a share or debenture certificate for example is worthless - 
the net monetary return of financial assets is in effect the equivalent of 
the utility of tangible assets. Using utility in this sense, the v?lue of 
financial assets clearly rises with their utility. A debenture on which 
interest is payable at 10 per cent per annum will command a higher price 
than a debenture of similar risk paying interest at only 5 per cent per 
annum. The greater the expected return for a given degree of risk, the 
greater the value.
This direct link between utility and value makes the valuation of financial 
assets much less subjective than that of tangible assets. Although emotion 
and sentiment sometimes enter into the valuation of financial assets, most 
of the subjectivity arises because the exact amount of the net monetary 
returns to be received in the future cannot be known with certainty. An
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investor on the Stock Exchange, for instance, has to form a judgement about 
the prospects for individual companies, the industries in which they operate 
and the national, and possibly international, economy. This characteristic 
of value, that it always looks to the future, is very significant.
The value of seme tiling cannot be stated in the abstract; all that can be 
stated is the value of the thing in a particular place, at a particular 
time, in particular circumstances. The question 'to whom?' and 'for what 
purpose?' must always be asked before a valuation can be carried out. This 
is because property nas a different value to different persons and these 
different values can have a marked effect on price. It would be wrong, for 
instance, to value an industrial property on its e>'sting use if an 
alternative, higher use was permitted by the planning authorities.
Similarly, a minority shareholding of 10 per cent of the equity of a company 
would normally have a lew value per share compared to the value per share of 
a controlling interest in the same company. But if that 10 per ce..t were to 
be sold to a holder of 45 per cent of the equity, thereby giving that person 
control, a much higher value per share would be expected.
Price versus value
Price and value are separate but related concepts. Confusion can arise 
through the misuse of these terms. Price is the monetary consideration 
received for the sale, or paid for the purchase, of goods and services. In 
u purchase/sale of goods or services there is one price but there are 
several values. A sells B a car for R3 000. Logically, A's car must be 
worth more to B than R3 000, or, more correctly, the other things that B can 
buy with R3 000. If this were not so, if B valued an alternative purchase 
more highly, he would not buy A's car but wouxd spend his R3 000 on the 
alternative. Similary, from A's point of view, iJs car is worth less than 
R3 000 to him, i.e. he places a higher value on the alternative goods
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costing R3 000 than he does on his car. If A was indifferent as to whether 
he kept his car or whether he switched into other goods or services, no 
transaction would take place for lack of motive. Similarly with B.
Market value
Whilst price is distinct fran value, prices in general are indicative of 
market value. Market value must be distinguished frests the opinions of value 
that individual market participants hold about marketable property. The 
central idea in the concept of market value is that of the most probable buy 
and sell price. The basis of market value is the assumption that if 
comparable property has fetched a certar'n price then the subjecc property 
will realise the same price, or something near to it. The validity of this 
assumption depends upon the continuation of the market from which the sales 
data were obtained or, more precisely, upon the continuation of the trends 
demonstrated in that market.
Market value is a significant concept of value because it implies that cash 
flows.can be generated if desired or necessary. Price should not be very 
different from market value for those cortnodities or properties in frequent 
demand. Thus, the price of Anglo American shares should be a fairly close 
indication of their market value at any particular time. On the other hand, 
the market in certain types of property can be extremely narrow and it may 
be necessary to wait along time before a buyer or seller can be found. When 
depressed conditions hit certain industries (e.q. property) it may be years 
before a willing buyer emerges. If the seller cannot wait that long, the 
price has to be lowered substantially. Enever sums up the position neatly:
'In brief, the conditions necessary for price to equate to market value 
are firstly that a reasonable time is available for potential vendors and 
purchasers to carry out necessary valuations and negotiations; secondly
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that potential partners to a transaction be fully informed of the extent 
of the competition; and finally there must, of course, be a sufficient 
demand for potential purchasers for there to be any true competition at 
all*.
Other types of value
Besides market value, many other types of value are encountered in 
valuation literature and in practice, e.g. book value, going concern value, 
depreciated value, liquidation cr break-up value, intrinsic value, 
replacement value, realisable value, goodwill or organisation value, current 
value, residual value and salvage value. Sane of these concepts are 
misleading and most of them are less than helpful. Book value, or net worth 
as it is sometimes referred to, is merely the amount at which the net assets 
of a company are stated in the books of account and the balance sheet. It 
is not value at all, but should be referred to as 'book amount’ or 'balance 
sheet amount1.
Intrinsic value may be a valid concept for tangible assets - if you cannot 
sell a loaf of bread you can at least eat it - but it should have no place 
in the valuation of financial assets. More often than not, it is used where 
we do not agree with market value. Thus, when share prices are low and 
ur, sually depressed, we might be tenpted to say that they are belcw their 
intrinsic value. What, we really mean is that we expect the market to 
improve oecause of some factor, say an economic upturn, which the market 
itself has not yet recognised or acknowledged. This is a dangerous position 
for the valuer to take as he must accept the judgement of the market place. 
He may be right or wrong in his speculation about the future, but this is 
nothing to do with any intrinsic value in the shares.
Goodwill or organisation value is not a separate type of value but merely
the value of one particular type of asset. Replacement value means 
replacement cost, whilst realisable value and current value are barely 
distinguishable from market value.
Liquidation value and going concern value are both different types of market 
value. Liquidation value occurs when assets of a business are sold 
piecemeal and possibly for scrap? it generally is the 'floor' value. A 
business sold as a going concern should fetch a price in excess of its 
liquidation value. The amount of the excess will depend on potential use. 
There are exceptions to this general rule, and liquidation value teay then be 
higher than going concern value. This could happen when a company has 
assets with a much higher alternative use value, e.g. it owns land zoned for 
residential development but uses it for industrial purposes.
Pair value
In South Africa there is another type of value - fair value. This is the 
term that generally appears in the pro-anption clauses of private companies' 
articles of association. It is cannon for the articles to stipulate that 
the auditor, or some other expert, shall, determine t'.io fair value of shares 
for the purchase and sale purposes. The concept of lair value is based on 
the desire to be equitable co both parties. The transaction is not in the 
open .T.nrket; the buyer has not been able to look around for the lowest 
price, nor has the seller been able to hold out for the highest price. In 
effect, the articles have restricted the market in the company's shares. To 
be fair, therefore, the value determined under the articles must recognise 
what the seller gives up in value and what the buyer acquires in value 
through the transaction.
If, for example, a minority shareholding of 5 per cent of the equity in a 
company is being acquired by a shareholder who already owns 46 per cent of
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the snare capital, it would be incorrect to value the t per cent 
shareholding purely as a minority holding. The value of these shares \o the 
buyer is considerable more than this since, with 51 per cent of the shares 
in his name, he will have control of the company.
The fair value of these shares will be sonsewhere in between their value as a 
pure minority holding and the increase in the value of the buyer's 
shareholding as a result of acquiring these shares, i.e. the difference in 
value between a 46 pet cent and 51 per cent shareholding. Just exactly 
where the fair value is pitched is for the valuer to decide, exercising his 
judgement in the light of all the circumstances. As can be imagined, this 
has proved a fruitful area for litigation, and the valuer must be fully 
conversant with the legal postion before accepting such an assignment.
Although value is a multi-faceted, somewhat elusive concjpt and valuation 
itself a subjective art with, in some people's view, a cosmetic content of 
science, it would be incorrect to conclude that the value of something is 
anybody's guess or that valuation is a matter of hunch or 'seat of the 
pants' feel. Most valuations done by experts proceed 90 per cent of their 
distance on well defined principles and the result can usually be stated in 
terms of a narrow ranga of values. The existence of a range of values does 
not mean that the value has been estimated, with the connotations of rough 
approximation which the word implies. Rather, value is determined or 
measured. This implies that the valuer has come to a decision on the value. 
There is nothing absolute or completely objective about the figure, and 
others may disagree, but the amount decided upon is still his opinion of the 
value.
CHAPTER 2
SUBJECT MATTER - 
DEFINITION OF A SHARE AND SHAREHOLDING
'Stocks or shares' are defined in the Estate Duty Actl as meaning, in 
relation to any company, 'any part of the share capital of that company 
including any debenture, debenture stock or any other like form of 
marketable security'. The definition of a 'share' as defined in the 
Companies Act2 is very similar: '"Share", in relation to a company, means 
a share in the share capital of that company and includes r.cock; and, in 
relation to a prospectus, means the share of a company, whether a company 
within the meaniny of this Act or not, and includes debentures and any 
rights or interests (by whatever name called) in a company or in or to 
shares of debentures.'
In the leading case of Borland's Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd^ Farwell J 
considered the meaning of a share:
'A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a 
sum of money, for the purpose of liablity in the first place, and of 
interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual 
covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se in accordance 
with s 16 of the Companies Act 1862. The contract contained in the 
articles of association is one of the original incidents of the share. 
The share is not a sum of money settled in the way suggested but is an 
interest measured by a sum of money and made up of various rights 
contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money of a 
more or less amount.'
In the estate duty cases of Re Crossman and Re Paulin^, tord MacMillan 
expressed the meaning of a share as follows:
'A share in a joint stock company is an entirely conventional creation; 
the congeries of rights and liabilities of which it consists is the
1 Section 1(1) of the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955
2 Section 1 (1} of the Companies Act 61 of 1973
3 (1901) 1 Ch 279 at 288
4 (1936) 15 ATC 94 at 117
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creature of the Companies Act and the memorandum and articles of the 
particular cotpany. Within the law the rights and liabilities 
appurtenant to a share may vary widely. But it cannot exist 
independently of the inherent attributes with which it has been created.'
In the same case the meaning of a share was also considered by Lord Russel 
of Xillowen at 115:
'It is the interest of a person in the company, that interest being 
composed of rights and obligations which are defined by the Companies Act 
and by the memorandum and articles of association of the company. A sale 
of a share is a dale of the interest, so defined and the subject matter 
of the sale is effectively vested in the purchaser by the entry of his 
name in the register of members. It may be that owing to provisions in 
the articles of association the subject matter of the sale cannot be 
effectively vested in the purchaser, because the directors refuse to and 
cannot be compelled to register .".he purchaser as shareholder. The 
purchaser could then secure the benefit of the sale by the registered 
shareholder becoming a trustee for him of the rights with an indemnity in 
respect of the coligations.'
Shareholders are not, however, part owners of the undertaking. In the eyes 
of the law, the undertaking is somewhat different from totality of the 
shareholdings. In short v Treasury ComrsS Evershed U  stated:
'Prims facie, as it seems to us, and apart from any special words in the 
regulation, each shareholder is entitled to get, and to get only the 
value of what he possesses? for that is all that he has to sell or 
transfer.1
Kenny J in Attorney-General v Janeson® expressed it as follows:
5 (1948) 1 KB 116 at 123
6 (1904) 2 IR 644 at 669
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'In considering whether that case (Borland's Trustee v Steel Bros & Co 
Ltd) was rightly decided, it is important to bear in mind the character 
of the property in question. It is not the property of the company that 
is subjected to restrictions on alienation* The assets of the company, 
its premises, stock in trade, etc, are alx capable of being disposed of 
without limitation or fetter of any sort* No shareholder has a right to 
any specific portion of the company's property, and save by, and to the 
extent of, his voting power at a general meeting of the company, cannot 
curtail the free and proper disposition of it. He is entitled to a share 
of the company's capital and profits, the former, in the words of Farwell 
J, being measured by a sum of money which is taken as the standard for 
the ascertainment of his share of the profits. If the company disposes 
of its assets, or if the latter be realised in a liquidation, he has a 
right to a proportion of the amount received after the discharge of the 
company's debts and liabilities. In acquiring these rights - that is, in 
becoming a member of the company - he is deemed to have simultaneously 
entered into a contract under seal to conform to the regulations 
contained in the articles of association. Whatever obligations are 
contained in these articles, he accepts the ownership of the shares and 
the position of a member of the company, bound and control.led by them.
He cannot divorce his money interest, whatever it may amount to, from 
these obligations. They are inseparable incidents attached to his 
rights, and the idea of a share cannot in my judgment be complete without 
their inclusion. This was the view taken by Farwell J, whose language 
was adopted by FitzGibbon LJ, in Casey v Bently (1902) 1 IR 393. He 
could not, nor could his personal representatives, retain the mere money 
interest and repudiate the contracts entered into in connection with it. 
The money interest and the contractual obligations form one whole, and no 
member could be heard to say that he had a right to retain the former and 
disclaim the latter.'
Chapter 3
THE CONCEPT OF VALUE
The meaning of the terra "value1 had to be determined by the Appellate 
Division in Pietermaritzburg Corporation v South African Breweries Ltd^ 
where the valuation of land for municipal rating purposes was in dispute.
The relevant statute was silent as to how the valuation of property was to 
be fixed for rating purposes. The court held that in the absence of 
statutory direction the proper standard of value was the market value and 
that 'the value of an article is, as a general rule, what it will fetch' .>2 
The court rejected any concept of value determined by reference to cost or 
its utility to the owner. Da Villiers JP examined the term 'value' in the 
light of writings on political economy Jaere the term 'value has two 
meanings - it sometimes expresses the utility of a particular object (called 
value in use) and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods (called 
value in exchange). In deciding that the value in exchange was the 
appropriate standard of value the judge recognized that 'value in exchange' 
could either be the temporary or market value of the property or its 
permanent or natural value to which the market -ralue tends to return after 
every variation. De Villiers JP concluded that the ordinary meaning of the 
term 'value1 is the temporary or market value.
The fundamental principles laid down in Pietermaritzburg Corporation v 
South African Breweries Ltd have been followed in nurnberous subsequent cases 
in South Africa.
In Katzoff v Glaser^ the court approved Voet's test of value. Dowling J 
concluded that '... it will be seen that Voet cites with approval i‘i the 
passage quoted from Book 18, a remark of 5;eneca, "that the value of anything 
is what it is worth" meaning thereby "what it will fetch". This has been a 
test of market value which has, necessarily, been widely used although it 
may not be the only or a conclusive test.1
1 1911 AD 501
2 The principle that the value of an arLicle is as a genreal rule, what it 
will fetch, is well recognized. See for example Elstow v Rose (R 4 OR 
p4)
3 1948 (4) SA 630 (T) at 636
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A more recent expression of the general valuation test in South Africa was 
that of CcLian J in Novick and another v Ccmair Holdings Ltd and Other^,
The court was there defiling with s 228 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which 
requires a company to obtain the approval of a general meeting of 
shareholders before, inter alia, disposing of the greater part of its 
assets. TWv. suggestions as to how a company1s unquoted share investments 
should be valued were put forward:
One was that their values should be determined by reference to the 
underlying net assets of the relevant companies based on balance sheet 
figures.
The other was that the calculation should be made solely by reference to the 
profits earned by the relevant companies during the past year. In rejecting 
both these suggestions Colman J held that 'the only test which can 
reasonably be applied in the application of the section is the test of 
value. And by that I mean market value in the sense of the price which the 
assets under consideration would fetch in a bona fide sale between s willing 
buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are reasonably well informed about 
the transaction, and neither of whan is under extraordinary pressure to buy 
or to sell, as the case may be'.
In the United Kingdom most litigation regarding the valuation of shares has 
arisen in the context of valuation for estate duty purposes. The general 
method of valuation for estate duty purposes is prescribed by the Finance 
Act of 1894:
Section 7 (5) provides that the principal value of any property shall be 
estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, such 
property would fetch if sold in the open market at the time of the death of
4 1978 (4) SA 671
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the deceased. Section 44 (1) provides that the market value in relation to 
any assets means the price which those assets might reasonably be expected 
to fetch on a sale in the open market. These two sections give rise to many 
arguments between professional advisers acting for taxpayers and various 
departments of the Board of Inland Revenue.
various guidelines have developed over the years. These have mostly been 
based on the decisions in IRC v Crossman5, Salvesen's Trustees v IRC6 
and Re Holt,. Holt v IRC^, and the whole position has been reviewed in the 
case of Re Lynall, Lynall v IRC^.
In Findlay's Trustees v CIR^ the court interpreted the section above as 
'the price which might be fetched in the open market <.. (on the assumption) 
that the transaction takes place between a willing seller and a willing 
purchaser1,
In the United States of America the general principle of valuation is stated 
as follows:
’The true value of a given ccmmcdity is the price for which that comnodity 
would exchange hands between a willing seller and a willing buyer, neither 
being under any compulsion to act, and both having full knowledge of the 
facts involved.1
5 (1937) AC 26
6 (1930) SLT 387
7 (1958) 2 All ER 1499
CO (1971) 2 All ER 341
9 (1938) 22 ATC 437
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In the Canadian case of Minister of Finance v Mann E s t a t e ^ ,  McIntyre J 
accepted the following definition: ' . the highest price available 
estimated in terms of money which a willing seller may obtain for the 
property in an open and unrestricted market from a willing, knowledgeable 
purchaser acting at arm's length'.
It remains to be considered what is meant by the term 'fair value'. There 
is no statutory definition of fair value and it does not appear to have been 
considered in any great detail by the courts.
In another Canadian cas.5, Untermeyer Estate v Attorney-General of British 
Columbia^, the Supreme Court pondered whether the expression 'fair' 
adds anything to the meaning of the words 'market value', except possibly 
.... 'that the market price must have some consistency and not be the effect 
of a transient bocm or a sudden panic on the market'.
10 (1972) 5 WWR 23 (BCSC), aff'd. (1973) CIC 561 (CA)
11 (1929) SCR 84
THE CONCEPT OF AN OPEN MARKET
A valuation may be made on the basis of various assumptions, one of these 
being known as the open market value, which is the price the shares would 
fetch if sold in the open market at the appropri&'e time. Thi3 basis of 
valuation is the one used for most fiscal purposes, with various statutory 
modification.
As discussed earlier, the Finance Act in the United Kingdom refers to the 
term 'principal value’. In Ellesmere (Earl) v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners^ Sankey J stated that principal value means 'the price which 
the proparty would have fetched on the death of the deceased in the open 
market if it had been then sold in such a manner and subject to such 
conditions as might reasonably be calculated to obtain for the vendor the 
best price for the property ...'
In the Pietermaritzburg Corporation case2 the Appellate Division also laid 
down the fundamental principle that the term 'value' means value in the open 
market. The concept of what is meant by an open market, has been expounded 
in several cases:
(a) It includes a sale by auction but is not confined to that; it would 
include property publicly announced in the usual way relevant to the 
property in question and designed to attract as much competition as 
possible. In Duke of Buccleuch v IRC,3 Lord Reid put it as follows: 
’Originally no doubt when one wanted to sell a particular item of 
porperty one took it to a market where buyers of that kind of 
property congregated. Then the owner received offers and accepted 
what he thought was the best offer that he was likely to get; and 
for seme kinds of property that is still done. But this phrase must
1 (1918) 119 LT 568 at 573
2 1911 AD 501
3 (1967) 1 All ER 129
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also be applied to other kinds of property where that is impossible. 
In my view the phrase requires that the seller must take - or here 
be supposed to have taken - such steps as are reasonable to attract 
as much competition as possible for the particular piece of property 
which is to be sold. Sometimes this will be by sale by auction, 
sometimes otherwise. I suppose that the biggest open market is the 
stock exchange, where there is no auction.'
Cozens-Hardy MR defined open market in the land value duty cases of IRC v
Clay and IRC v Buchanan^ in the following terms:
'It would include property publicly announced in the usual way by 
insertion in the lists of house agents. But it does not necessarily 
involve the idea of a sale without resen/e. I can see no ground for 
excluding from consideration the fact that the property is so situate 
that to one or more persons it presents greater attractions than to 
anybody else. The house or the land may immediately ajoin one or more 
landowners likely to offer more than the property would be worth to 
anybody else. This is a fact that cannot be disregarded.'
In the same case Swinfen Eady U  stated^;
'a value, ascertained by a reference to the airount obtainable in an open 
market, shows an intention to include every possible purchaser. The 
market is to be the open market, as distinguished from an offer to a 
limited class only, such as the members of the family. The market is not 
necessarily an auction sale. The section means such amount as the land 
might be expected to realise if offered under conditions enabling every 
person desirous of purchasing to come in and make an offer, and if the 
proper steps were taken to advertise the property and let all likely 
purchasers know that the land is in the market for sale.'
4 (1914) 3 KB 466
5 Supra footnote • at 475
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The tern open market was also considered in the land value duty case of
Gloss v IRC6. Lord Johnston stated:
'I think the referee is mistaken in assuming that open market necessarily 
means sale by auction, A sale takes place in open market if the subject 
is put on the market and the best offer taken, however made.'
(b) The seller must be assumed to be acting voluntarily. In Sri Raja 
Vyricheria Narayana Gajapatiraju Bahadur Garu v Revenue Divisional 
Officer7, compensation was paid by the government for expropriation 
of land. Lord Rctner, concerned with the value of the land, said:
’The compensation must be determined, therefore, by reference to the 
price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from 
a willing purchaser. The disinclination of the vendor to part with 
his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy must alike 
be disregarded. Neither must be considered as acting under 
compulsion. This is implied in the common saying that the value of 
the land is not to be estimated at its value to the purchaser. This 
does not mean, however that the fact that sane particular purchaser 
might desire the land more than others is to be disregarded.*
(c) The seller must be assumed not to be in an undue haste to dispose of 
assets (Weber and Pretorius v Gavronsky Brothers).8
(d) Whether the hypothetical sale is assumed to be by auction or otherwise 
it must not be supposed that the owner would withdraw the property if a 
sufficient offer was not forthcoming -■ an estimate must be made of what 
the property would have fetched on the particular day if it had been 
exposed for sale. (Duke of Buccleuch and another v IRC).9
6 (1915) SC 449
7 (1939) 2 All ER 317
8 (1920) AD 48
9 (1967) 1 All ER 129
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(e) Even though the property falling to be valued is not readily realizable 
it must nevertheless be valued as long as it is capable of valuation.
In Gold Coast Trust Ltd v Humphrey^, Viscount Simon commented as 
follows:
'It seems to me that it is not correct to say that an asset, such as 
this block of shares, cannot be valued in money for inccme tax 
purposes in the year of its receipt because it cannot, in a 
commercial sense, be irnmediately realised. That is no reason for 
saying that it is incapable of being valued, though, if its 
realisation cannot take place promptly, that may be a reason why the 
money figure set against it at the earlier date should be reduced in 
order to allow for an appropriate interval. Supposing, for example, 
the contract conferring the asset on the taxpayer included a 
stipulation that the asset should not be realised by the transferee 
for five years, and that, if an attempt was made to realise it 
before that time, the property in it should revert to the 
transferor. This might seriously reduce the value of the asset when 
received, but it is no reason for saying that, whan received, it 
must be regarded as having no value at all.'
It is also immaterial that no one was actually in a position to sell the 
property. For example,
1 shares in conpanies which had belonged to an enemy alien, but were at 
the time of his death in the control of the Public Trustee as custodian, 
(nevertheless) had to be valued for duty at the ordinary market price of 
similar securities'.11
10 U948) 2 All ER 379
11 Re Aschrott, Clifton v Strauss (1927) 1 Ch. 313;
See also Inland Revenue Commissioners v Crossman, Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Mann (1937) AC 26; 1936 1 All ER 762
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(f) In estimating the price which would be fetched in the open market, it 
must be assumed that the transaction takes place between a willing 
seller and a willing purchaser. The willing seller - willing purchaser 
conception is in principle a simple one based on the thesis that a 
cannon price will be acceptable to both parties to the transaction.
This concept is discussed later (see page 37).
Legal fiction
It is obvious that the open market value for fiscal purposes is a statutory 
fiction which ignores the impossibility of an actual sale. In the words of 
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in the estate duty case of Duke of Buccleuch v 
IRC*2:
'The value of any property must be estimated to be the price which, in 
the opinion of the conrnissioner, the property would fetch if sold in the 
open market at the time of the death of the deceased. "At the time of 
the death" must not be paraphrased or altered so as to read "within a 
reasonably short time of the death". It follows from this that the 
section is envisaging a hypothetical sale at the time of the death. This 
is quite inconsistent with the notion that the value of a piece of 
property is to be estimated by postulating that preparations for an 
actual sale would be commenced at but after the time of death and that a 
sale would follow after such preparation. This is now what the section, 
which is in effect a valuation section, envisages. The section 
prescribes the criterion of valuation.'
This concept of a hypothetical sale was also considered by Plownan ,7 in the 
estate duty case of in Re Lynall, Lynall v IRC^3 as follows:
'It is cannon ground that the shares must be valued on the basis of a 
hypothetical sale .... in a hypothetical open market between a
12 (1967) 1 AC 506 at 535
13 (1971) 47 TC 375 at 377 *
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hypothetical willing vendor and a hypothetical willing purchaser on the 
hypothesis that no one is excluded from buying and that the purchaser 
would be registered as the holder of his shares but would then hold them 
subject to the articles of association of the company, including the 
restrictions on transfer.'
In other words, the hypothetical willing purchaser buys in the open market 
but should he ever need to sell, will sell in the restricted market allowed 
by the articles. This requirement of selling in the restricted market will 
usually be a depreciatory factor in a valuation.
Even the fact that an actual sale would be illegal is ignored in arriving at 
the open market value. This was confirmed by Eve J in the estate duty case 
of Re Aschrott, Clifton v Strauss^:
'At the testator's death part of the property passing under his will 
consisted of shares saleable in the open market. It is true that, by 
reason of the subsisting war, he was disqualified, and his executors 
after his death were disqualified, from transferring the shares, but 
these shares were only part of the share capital of the several companies 
in which he was interested, and, in order to ascertain the market price 
of the shares which were disposed of by his will the broker was bound, I 
think, to find out at what price seme of the shares were being sold and 
dealt with on the market and to return that as being the correct 
valuation; it was open to the valuer to say: "The market price o£ shares 
in this particular company is so much, but, in view of the fact that the 
transferor of these shares is an alien enemy, the market for seme of the 
shares (those which he would be purporting to transfer) would be nil"'.
Actual sales around the date of the valuation of the shares may be
14 (1927) 1 Ch 313 at 322
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persuasive evidende in arriving at the open market value^ but are not 
conclusive as the actual circumstances may differ from those which have to 
be hypothesised in an open market valuation^.
Neutral identity
It has repeatedly been laid down that in applying the yardstick of the 
postulated sale in the open market, every possible purchaser must be taken 
into account. The property must be assumed to be 'offered under conditions 
enabling every person desirous of purchasing to come in and make an offer’, 
proper steps being taken to advertise the property and let all likely 
purchasers knew that the property is for sale^.
In applying the abovementioned principle, one of the possible elements in 
valuation is the existence of a person or class of persons (referred to as 
1 special purchasers’) to whom the property or shares in question is more 
valuable or more desirable than to the general public.
Special purchasers
In valuing shares and other property the courts have generally
(a) ignored the particular identity of the owner whose property is being 
valued; and
(b) have not taken into account the identity of any particular purchaser
except that the requirements cc a particular purchaser might influence the 
price which a hypothetical neutral purchaser may be prepared to pay.
This general principle was dealt with in an early ease, Bradford-on-Avon 
Assessment Committee V White18 where consideration had to be given to 
the effect on the value of a property which had a special value to a 
particular
15 See McNamee v IRC (1954) IR 214
16 See IRC v Marr’s Trustees (1906) 44 Sc LR 647
17 Inland Revenue Commissioners v clay, Inland Revenue Commissioners v 
Buchanan (1914) 5 KB 466
18 (1898) 2 QB 630
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buyer. The court dealt with this as follows:
'I do not think that it is right to say that the competition of brewers 
should be wholly excluded from consideration, but the special prices 
which they may give, owing to personal considerations, and not on account 
of the \alue of the premises, should be excluded except so far as the 
possibility of such special prices being obtained raises the market value 
generally.'
The principle was followed in IRC v Clay, IRC v Buchanan^. in this 
case a property which adjoined a nurses home fell to be valued. It was 
known that the trustees of the nurses home were anxious to buy the property; 
and were prepared to pay El 000 for the property which was only worth £750. 
It was held that £1 000 was the statutory value.
The court held that a value to be ascertained by reference to an amount 
realizable in an open market meant an intention to include every possible 
purchaser; the fact that one particular purchaser was prepared to pay more 
would influence the price but the value must not be fixed at the price which 
that purchaser in particular would pay. Cozens-Hardy MR postulated an 
example of a small farm in the middle of a wealthy landowner's estate. The 
value of that farm would not be the price which the wealthy landowner would 
be prepared to pay - the value would be the amount which purchasers on the 
open market would be prepared to pay in the knowledge that they may be able 
to resell it at a profit to the wealthy landowner.
Thus, although it is clear that a special purchaser has to be included as a 
possible purchaser, the next point to consider is what effect this would 
have on the price. In the words of Swiften Eady U:
19 (1914) 3 KB 466 CA
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1 It was then urged by the Solicitor General that if the probability of 
the special buyer purchasing, above the price, which but for his needs 
would have been the market price, could be taken into consideration at 
all/ then only one further point or bid could be allowed, and it must be 
assumed that this special buyer would have become the purchaser upon 
making this one extra bid. Such an assumption would ordinarily be quite 
erroneous. The knowledge of the special need would affect the market 
price and others would join in competing for the property with a view of 
obtaining it at a price less than that of which the opinion would be 
formed that it would be worth the while of the special buyer to 
purchase.1
Glass v Inland Revenue Ccranissioners2  ^on land value duty, although not 
a case involving shares, is also of particular interest in considering the 
position of a special purchaser. A farm, the agricultural value of which 
was £3 379, was known to be required sooner or later by Water Commissioners, 
and was in fact acquired by them two years after the material date for 
E5 000. The Court fixed the statutory value at £4 629.
'An estimate of the price obtainable for land in the open market,' said Lord 
Cullen, 'must proceed on the footing of people acting in the way which is in 
accordance with their interests.'
On the other hand, in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Crossman, Inland 
Revenue Camissioner v Mann (an estate duty case, the main point of which 
will be discussed later), it became necessary to determine the price which 
would be paid in the open market for shares in a private company, the 
transfer of which was rigorously restricted, on terms that the buyer would 
be registered as holder of the shares, but would hold them subject to the 
restrictions. There was evidence that a particular trust company was
20 1915 SC 449
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prepared to pay a certain price? but a lower figure was adopted.
In the Court of first instance, Finlay J22 had held that the open market 
theory could not mean that every person in the world had notionally got to 
be considered as in the market; and disregarded the potential Lid of the 
trust company from a business point of view on the grounds that (on the 
evidence) it would have ascertained that the directors would refuse to 
register it and so would not have been in the market.
Various and conflicting remarks were made on the subject in the House of 
Lords, but careful analysis of the speeches clearly indicates that the true 
ratio of the decision to adopt the lower figure lay in the fact that Lord 
Plender (whose evidence on the valuation auestions had been accepted by 
Finlay J) said that he had taken the trust company into account au . 
possible purchaser in arriving at that figure. Lord Blanesburgh said2^
'I agree with, I believe, all your Lordships in thinking that any possible 
bid for the shares by a trust company .-’as allowed for by Lord Plender in his 
estimate ..., accepted by the learned jud<_,e as reliable.' Lord Russell of 
Killowen said - 'I feel a difficulty in understanding how, if Lord Plender's 
figure is accepted, as it was by Finlay J any higher figure could rightly be 
substituted for it. As I read the learned judge's judgment Lord Plender in 
arriving at his figure had treated the market as open, and had excluded no 
one Erom it. The whole world was hypothetically there, making hypothetical 
bids'. It seems that the House of Lords regarded the acceptance by Finlay J 
of Lord Plender's figure as a determination of fact which they were not, in 
the circumstances, concerned to question.
But Lord Blanesburgh continued - 'Had that not been so' -i.e. had Lord 
Plender not taken the trust company into account - 'the Crown’s contention 
on this point would have been, I think, unanswered.' And as respects Finlay
21 (1937) AC 26? (1936) 1 All ER 762, H.L; see p 410 post
22 See (1935) 1 KB 26,35
23 (1937) AC, at p 62
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J.’s decision, already mentioned, Viscount Railsham LC said - 'The learned
judge says that he excluded trust companies from the possible buyers because
he had evidence to satisfy him that the directors would not have consented
to put them upon the register. I cannot think that this is a proper reason 
1• • o
On the other hand, he went on - '... the extra sum which could be obtained 
from trust companies was not an element of the value in the open market, but 
rather a particular price beyond the ordinary market price which a trust 
company would give for reasons of its own. I do not think it would be right 
to appreciate the value of the shares because of this special demand for a 
special purpose from a particular buyer.'
It is doubtful whether Lord Blanesburgh's remarks are to be regarded as 
settled law; but i£ they are, they suggest at first sight a conflict with 
the earlier decisions in Clay and Glass. Lord Macmillan, in fact, in the 
later case of Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd v Exirhara County 
A s s e s s m e n t ^  took the opposite point of view to Lord Blanesburgh: "The 
motives which actuate buyers in a market may be of all kinds, but it is 
not their motives but their bids that matter."
The explanation may be merely that, on the accepted evidence, the trust 
company, though willing, would not have needed to go beyond the figure 
adopted. support for this view may be found in the judgment of Hannan LJ in 
the Court of Appeal in Re Lynall, Lynall v IRC25 (to be discussed 
later):
'It was the taxpayer's argument that directors must be excluded from 
amongst possible purchasers because they would be "special" purchasers.
I do not accept this and am of opinion that this is not an ingredient in 
the Crossman decision. In Crossman's case it was decided that the fact
24) (1938) AC 321; (1938) 2 All ER 79 at 85
25) (1971) 47 TC 375 at 396
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that a "special" purchaser, namely a trust company, would have offered a 
special price must be ignored, but this was because that particular 
purchaser had a reason special to him for so doing. So here a director 
who would give an enhanced price because he would thus obtain control of 
the company would be left out of account. But that is not to say that 
directors as such are to be ignored. All likely purchasers are deemed to 
be in the market,’
Alternatively, it may be that Lord Blanesburgh's remarks suggest that it is 
not legitimate to enquire into the state of mind of a particular person, 
where it cannot be inferred form external facts. In the Crossman case, in 
contrast to the Clay and Glass cases, there were no such facts.
It could also be that the second alternative is merely one facet of a 
broader distinction which can, if necessary, be drawn between the tw types 
of case. The circumstance that rendered the trust company so 'special' a 
purchaser in the Crossman case was its ability in fact to avoid to some 
degree the onus of the restrictions on transfer: its practice was to hold 
investments as naninee for several subsidiaries and the beneficial ownership 
of a shareholding could have been transferred from one subsidiary to another 
without the necessity for re-registration of the legal title. Some light on 
the point may be thrown by the earlier case of Inland Revenue v Marr's 
Trustees26, which will be met again hereafter in another context and 
which, in fact, also involved a special purchaser (though the 'special 
purchaser' theory was not stressed in the judgment),
In ’.his case, which concerned the relevance to an estate duty valuation of 
the price realised at an auction of cattle seme time after the death, one of 
the 'adventitious circumstances' which led the court to reject the sale 
price was the presence at the sale of a bidder who had accidentally found an
26 (1906) 44 Sc L R 647
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underwriter prepared (contrary to and, it was suggested/ in ignorance of the 
normal practice) to undertake certain risks involved in the purchase without 
a preliminary veterinary certificate; and who was thereby enabled to offer a 
better price than the other bidders. The Lord Ordinary's remark? "nggest 
chat even had the sale taken place at the death, the price paid by such a 
purchaser would not have formed a true criterion of the open market value.
It is interesting to note that in both the Crossman and Marr's Trustees 
cases, the 'special price' was a result, not of any attraction to the 
purchaser inherent in the property itself, but of sane special 
personal characteristic or advantage peculiar to the purchaser which, 
while not affecting the intrinsic worth of the property, enabled him to 
offer a better price for it.
To put the matter somewhat differently, the 'special price' was due not to 
sane advantage inherent in the property but to the fact that the bidder’s 
own position enabled him to minimise certain risks or disadvantages involved 
in its possession,
It is accordingly submitted that the special price which might be offered by 
a particular purchaser is only to be ignored as a yardstick, if at all, in 
the exceptional case where it is the result of seme such peculiarity which 
(even though its operation stems fran sane ancillary attribute of the 
property, e.g. the restrictions on transfer in the Crossman case) appertains 
basically to the person of the purchaser. And even then the presence in 
the market of such a purchaser may have an indirect and modified effect on 
the general market level.
Support for this view may be found in the judgment (in the Court of Appeal 
in the Crossman case) of Lord Hanworth MR citing with approval certain
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remarks of Channell J in Bradford-on-Avon Assessment Canmittee v 
White^?: the ccnpetition of (particular buyers) should not be
wholly excluded from consideration, but the special prices (the buyers) may 
give, cwing to personal considerations, and not on account of the value of 
the premises, should be excluded except so far as the possibility of such 
special prices being obtained raises the market value generally'.
It is true that the actual decision in the Bradford-on-Avon case was 
overruled by the HOuse of Lords in the Robinson Brothers case.
It was there held that, in assessing licensed premises for rating purposes, 
the rent which brewers would pay (with a view either to subletting or to 
occupation) must be taken into account. But the ruling is thought to have 
stemmed not so much from any fundamental disapproval of the principle 
enunciated by Channell J in the earlier case (and cited by Lord Hanworth in 
the Crossman case) as from its inapplicability to the facts under 
consideration: it was evidently considered that the rent in question was 
properly attributable to the intrinsic value of the property. Indeed the 
speech of Lord Macmillan seems to reinforce rather than weaken the validity 
of the basic principle in relation to the type of 'special purdaser' now
under consideration.28
On the other hand, the Robinson Brothers case, coming as it did after the 
Crossman case, strengthens the authority of the Clay and Glass cases for the 
proposition that the price which a particular purchaser would pay is a 
yardstick of open market value where the attraction of the property for that 
purchaser is inherent in the property itself. And this is considered to be 
so even where the property is specially attractive because of some other 
property cwned by the potential purchaser e.g. as respects shares in a 
private company, where the acquisition of the vendor's holding would give
27 (1898) 2 QB 630 at 639
28 Seo Green's Death Duties by DJ Lawday and Ed Mann 5th Edition
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control to another shareholder; in the case of partnership assets, as 
respects a surviving partner; or in the case of professional goodwill, as 
respects a son who acted as the deceased's professional assistant. In such 
a case, the 'special price' is no more than the intrinsic value of the 
acquired property in the hands of the special purchaser. Once common 
ownership of the two ’properties' has been established, the enhanced value 
achieves a permanency which would be reflected in the price realised on a 
subsequent sale by the original purchaser. It is independent of that 
purchaser's personal attributes.
It remains to he mentioned that where property is to be valued, reference 
must be had not merely to the actual current use to which the property is 
being put but also to any other use (i.e. 'value' must take account of 
potentialities) to which it may reasonable be put and which might enhance 
its value.
This particular point was considered in the Indian compulsory purchase case 
of Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v Revenue Divisional Officer, 
Vizagapatam29, another post - Crossman case, by the Privy Council. It 
was laid down, that for the purposes of compulsory acquision, 'value' must 
take account of potentialities, even where the only possible purchaser of 
the potentialities is the acquiring authority, on the ground that otherwise 
the vender would not be a 'willing seller’.
The position of the special purchaser was considered as follows^0:
'Proceeding therefore with the imaginary auction tit which are present two 
classes of buyers, namely the 'poramboke buyers' (persons who are in no 
way interested in the land's potentialities) and the 'potentiality 
buyers', the former will disappear from the biddings as soon as the
29 (1939) AC 302
30 Supra footnote 29 at 315
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'poramboke' value has been reached and the bidding will thereafter be 
confined to the 'potentiality buyers.1 But at what figure will this 
bidding stop? As already pointed out it cannot be imagined as going on 
until the ultimate purchaser has been driven by the competition up to a 
fantastic price. For he is ex-hypothesis a willing purchaser and not one 
who is by circumstances forced to buy. Nor can the bidding be imagined 
to stop at the first advance on the'poramboke value'. For the vendor is 
a willing vendor and not one compelled by circumstances to sell his 
potentiality for anything that he can get. The arbitrator will, 
therefore, continue the imaginary bidding until a bid is reached-which in 
the arbitrator's estimate, represents the true value to the vendor of the 
potentiality. The auction will therefore have been an entire waste of 
the arbitrator's imagination. If the value cf the potentiality be Rs X 
the imaginary auction will have taken place tc ascertain the value of X 
from the imaginary oidding, and all that can be said is that the bidding 
will stop at Rs X.
The truth of the matter is that the value <_■£ the potentiality must be 
ascertained by the arbitrator on such materials as are available to him 
and without indulging in feats of the imagination.
Their Lordships would not have thought it necessary to deal with this 
question of the imaginary auction at such length were it not for the fact 
that in the argument before them the respondent's counsel endeavoured to 
show by reference to such an auction that when there was only one 
possible purchaser of the potentiality the value of it to the vendor was 
nil - that is to say that the value of the land with the potentiality was 
substantially nothing in excess of its value without it ...
Upon the question of the value of the potentiality where there is only
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one possible purchaser there are some authorities to which their 
Lordships will have to refer. But dealing with the matter apart from 
authority would seem that the value should be the sum which the 
arbitrator estimates a willing purchaser would pay and not what a 
purchaser would pay under compulsion. It was contended on behalf of the 
respondent that at an auction where there is only one possible purchaser 
of the potentiality the bidding will only rise above the "poramboke" 
value sufficiently to enable the land to be knocked down to that 
purchaser. Bat if the potentiality is of value to the vendor if there 
happen to be two or more possible purchasers of it, it is difficult to 
see why he should be willing to part with it for noching merely because 
there is only one purchaser. To compel him to do so is to treat him as a 
vendor parting with his land under compulsion and not as a willing 
vendor. The fact is that the only possible purchaser of potentiality is 
usually quite willing to pay for it.'
In Rf5 Aschrott, Clifton v Straubs31 a shareholder, a German subject, was
disqualified from selling shares owned by him in British companies because 
of the war between Germany and Britain. Upon his death during the war his 
executors were similarly disqualified from selling or transferring these 
shares. The court rejected the argument by the executors that the market 
price of the shares should be depreciated because the shares were held by an 
alien enemy. It was held that the shares had to be valued in disregard of 
the fact that the shareholder was incompetent to sell or transfer the shares 
at the valuation date.
A similar -question arose in Re Samuel Thornley32 where there was an 
understanding between the deceased shareholder (whose shares had to be
valued) and his soil that the deceased would only dispose of his shares to 
his son and to no-one else. The court disregarded this and proceeded to
31 (1927) 1 Ch 313
32 (1928) 7 Annotated Tax Cases 178
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value the shares on the lines of a hypothetical -r who would be 
unencumbered by any scruples in selling his shares to an outsider.
The House of Lords in Re Lynall, Lynall v IRc33 took, the line that so 
long as every practical person was included in the potential purchasers, 
this was sufficient for the purposes of the statute. In this case, the 
argument revolved round the amount of information which would be available 
to the potential purchaser. The deceased had held approximately 67 000 
shares which was a minority holding in an unquoted company. However, the 
directors had been advised by a finn of accountants and a firm of 
stockbrokers that they should seek to have the shares of the company quoted 
on the Stock Exchange, This advice had been given in a number of reports 
and had been discussed by the directors. The Revenue contended that any 
potential purchaser of the shares would require information from the 
directors as to the future possibilities of the company and that in fact 
they would have provided him with the information that the company might 
become a public company and have its shares quoted. On being asked whether 
they would have supplied such information, the directors of the company 
stated that they would have not done so. They considered that on any 
transfer of shares the only information which would have been provided would 
have teen that in the published accounts. On this basis the judge in the 
High Court fixed the value of the shares at E3 10s Od. per share but 
provided that if the information relating to the possible public issue were 
disclosed, the valuation should be E4 10s. Od. per share. In the Court of 
Appeal in 1969 the Inland Revenue were successful in convincing the court 
that the valuation of the shares should be £4 10s. Od. per share. On this 
basis, they contended that directors would have to disclose information of 
any kind requested by a potential buyer provided that information was within 
the knowledge of the directors. However, their views received a substantial 
setback in the House of Lords, who rejected the Revenue's argument 
unanimously. Everyone of the five Lav/ Lords stated that the provision of 
such information was contrary to the statute. For a sale to take place in
33 (1971) 3 All ER 914
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the open market, it must not require the hypothetical purchaser to extract 
information frcm the directors in the manner suggested. The potential buyer 
must be deemed to have such information as has been made public but not 
information which was known only to a director. In fact, Lord Pearson went 
on to say that in the- case of a director it was not to be assumed that he 
had any special kncwledqe. Information which ha had relating to the 
company's affairs would not affect the market value of those shares, since 
that information would not be available to other potential buyers in the 
open market and therefore the directors would be able to buy the shares at a 
lower price than if that knowledge were available to the public, in certain 
cases no doubt he would have to pay a price higher than would be the case if 
his own knowledge had been disclosed to the public, e.g. wher-s the company 
has had a period of profitable trading and the director knowo that the 
subsequent year's results will shew a loss.
It is, however, suggested that to regard the director as excluded frcm the 
open market is incorrect. Furthermore, if two directors ware both in the 
market then their special knowledge should come into the calculation, since 
each would be prepared to outbid the other director if he was anxious to 
obtain the shares. The main difficulty here is how far it is necessary to 
take into account the actual facts of the case and not deem the whole matter 
to be a hypothetical sale. It night seem, following the House of Lords 
decision, that in every case it is necessary to regard the whole matter as 
hypothetical with the possible exception of the number of shares involved 
and the nature of the company. However, it is suggested that this is not 
the correct view of the House of Lords decision ;ince the value of the 
shares (which are an actuality) must be on the basis of the circumstances 
surrounding those shares.
In considering the words 'open market,' therefore, it is not to be assumed 
that the advisers to the potential purchaser would have any information 
available only to the directors and there must be a limit on the questions
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which they could put to those directors. The fact that nobody would buy 
shares in a private company without the fullest investigation was rejected 
by the House of Lo- ds as irrelevant. The Revenue had contended for this 
basis, but their Lordships stated that in their view this was not u sale in 
the open market, it wa** a specific sale to a specific purchaser and was 
consequently contrary to the terms of the statute.
It has always been considered necessary to determine the position as at the 
moment of death of the deceased and to reject the wisdom that might be 
provided by hindsight. 'It is necessary to assume the prophetic vision of a 
prospective purchaser at the mcment of death of the deceased and firmly to 
reject the wisdom which might be provided by the knowledge of subsequent 
events.'34 jt is, however, necessary to assume that all steps have been 
taken up to the moment of death b"» place the shares in the open market. 
Furthermore, it must be assumed that any purchaser would be unobjectionable 
to the directors so that the shares could be transferred into his name. It 
must be assumed that the deceased or donor was a willing seller. It is 
suggested, however, that the views of the seller must also be considered in 
any case since clearly he would not sell to a hypothetical purchaser where 
another hypothetical purchaser would be likely to give him a higher price. 
The views of the hypothetical seller must not be entirely disregarded.
It must be presumed that the hypothetical purchaser will be advised by 
experts as to the value of the shares. But as Danckwerts J, stated in the 
Holt case, 'in my task I have had the assistance of a number of experts on 
each side who differ in their opinions in the manner in which experts 
normally do and the crankest of them admitted that certain of his 
calculations were simply guesswork, even if it was intelligent guesswork.'
1. chis case, the Crown had originally contended for £3 per share but had 
finally reduced their price to 25s. per share. At the time they determined 
the value of the shares, for the purposes of the High Court appeal, the
34 Re Holt (1953) 1 WLR 1488 at 1492
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valuation was 34s. The petitioners had argued for a value of 11s. 3d. per 
share but later increased this to 17s. 2d. Danckwerts J., after considering 
all their opinions and stating that there was no certain answer possible, 
valued the shares at 19s. per share, it is obvious with any substantial 
number of shares that the amount of duty involved varied enormously when the 
values were either 11s. 3d. or £3 or the final figure of 19s.
Whether it is satisfactory to put a taxpayer's estate at the sort of risk 
resulting from such method of valuation is a matter for tax advisers to 
argue.
Apart from accounts which have been completed prior to the date of death or 
disposal, the company's memorandum and articles of association and the 
information which a potential purchaser could find out relating to the 
industry in which the company exists, what other information is relevant?
It is suggested that every particular case must be taken on its own facts 
and it is necessary to look not only to the existing shareholders as 
potential purchasers but also to outsiders. In so far as there are actual 
persons involved in the open market, the views of those persons are probably 
relevant in the argument. But if there is only one person who possesses any 
specialised knowledge, that specialised knowledge must be rejected, since it 
cannot be publicly held. If two people have that knowledge, then it seems 
not unreasonable to include them in the hypothetical purchasers v/ho by 
reason of their knowledge might be prepared to bid against each other. An 
intriguing thought is whether reports in the local newspapers regarding the 
firm's activities would be regarded as being publicly available and could 
therefore affect the price which a hypothetical purchaser might pay. 
obviously,the informaf in in directors' minutes would not be available to 
the purchaser and must therefore be disregarded.
Special sellers
However, the question of the special purchaser has its converse side. Quite
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apart from any statutory injunction, it would clearly not be right in 
estimating the open market value of property to take into account any 
special value which for reasons personal to the deceased alone was attached 
to the property while it was in his hands and which did not follow the 
property into the hands of the purchaser, it may be that the existence of 
such a value (whether a mere sentimental attachment to the property or seme 
other concrete advantage) would in fact have made the deceased an unwilling 
seller at the postulated 'fair price'. But the term 'open market' requires 
the assumption of a willing seller; and the question is not what the 
property was worth to the deceased, but what would be a fair price for the 
property which would pass from vendor to purchaser by reason of the 
hypothetical sale,
THE WILLING BUYER - WILLING SELLER CONCEPT
In estimating the price which would be fetched in the open market, it must 
be assumed that the transaction takes place between a willing seller and a 
willing p u r c h a s e r 34. However, there are some aspects of this concept 
which should be clarified, particularly in respect of valuation for estate 
duty purposes. Under these circumstances, what has to be ascertained is the 
real value as at date of death, and this is not necessarily the same as 
market value, which could be more or less.
Willing buyer
In the estate duty case of The Trustees of Johan Thomas Salvesen v IRC^5 
Lord Fleming considered the characteristics of the buyer as follows:
'A person who was being invited to acquire a third of the shares in a 
private company which imposed stringent conditions on the right of 
transfer would certainly wish to ascertain the value at which the assets 
had been entered in the last balance sheet. As a prudent person he would
34 Findlay's Trustees v IRC (1938) 22 ATC 437
35 (1913) 9 ATC 43 at 50
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of course keep in view that he was purchasing the shares in October 1926 
and that the balance sheet shews the affairs of the company as at June 
1926, and he would make inquiry as to the alterations in its financial 
position which had taken place between these two dates.'
The courts have repeatedly held that in applying the willing buyer/willing 
seller test, the buyer must be assumed:
(a) to be a person of reasonable prudence; and
(b) to have had access to accounts and other information which would be 
likely to be available to him and to have informed himself of all 
relevant facts so far as known at the valuation date.
In Holt & others v IRC^S the accounts int t;>e previous year were not 
finally completed at the date or ' ot the d-ceased* Danckwerts J said 
that it was fair to assume the '■ Liafcior> as to the approximate results of 
the year's trading would have bet-, .scertained by a prospective purchaser. 
This must be compared to the decision in Lynall & another v IRC37 where, 
as discussed before, the question was whether it could be assumed that a 
prospective purchaser would have available to him certain confidential 
information about the possible public flotation of the company which was in 
the hands of the directors. The comments of Danckwerts J in Holt's case 
Were argued in support of this proposition. The House of Lords held that 
confidential information could not be assumed to be available to a 
prospective pur-*as-*r and that the seller of shares in a company, even if he 
is a director, must be assumed to be an honest man who would not make an 
improper disclosure of confidential information.
Lord Donovan in the Lynall case felt that it would not be right to treat as 
confidential accounts of the company already prepared and awaiting 
presentation to the shareholders. It is therefore still an open question as 
to what extent financial results for a preceding year must be assumed to be 
known to a prospective purchaser where, at the valuation date financial 
statements have either not yet been drawn up or have been drawn up but have
36 (1953) 32 ATC 402
37 (1971) 3 All ER 914
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not yet been to shareholders.
Lord Fleming in the estate duty case of Findlay's Trustees v IRC38 
stated:
'In estimating the price which might be fetched in the open market for 
the goodwill of the business it must be assumed that the transaction 
takes place between a willing seller and a willing purchaser; and that 
the purchaser is a person of reasonable prudence, who has informed 
himself with regard to all the relevant facts such as the history of the 
business, its present position, its future prospects and the general 
conditions of the industry; and also that he has access to the accounts 
of the business for a number of years.'
It should be mentioned that the hypothetical willing buyer may be dram from 
any likely source. In the Australian case of Jekyll v Ccmrdssioner of stamp 
Duties (Queen s l a n d ) ,39 a valuation was required of a parcel of one per 
cent preference shares of El each, with no voting rights. Although the low 
income made these shares unattractive to outsiders, Dixon C.J. considered 
that the ordinary shareholders would have a strong interest in acquiring 
them to exclude strangers from an ultimate substantial share in the 
company's assets. He stated that the other class of shareholders 'cannot be 
excluded from the body of persons whence the hypothetical purchaser is to be 
drawn'.
Willing seller
In the land value duty cases of IRC v Clay, IRC v Buchanan^O 'willing 
seller' was defined by Swinfen Eady LJ as follows:
'A sale by a willing seller is distinguished from a sale which is made by
38 (1938) 2 ATC 437 at 440
39 (1962) 106 CLR 353
40 (1914) 3 KB 466 at 476
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reason of compulsory powers, where the vendor frequently obtains an 
addition to the price by reason of being under compulsion to sell. It 
does not mean a sale by a person willing to sell his property without 
reserve for any price he can obtain. Mrs Buchanan was a willing seller 
when she accepted £1 000. The fact that she was persuaded or induced to 
agree voluntarily to sell at that price did not make her any the less a 
willing seller. There was no evidence of any compulsion; there was 
friendly bargaining, seme discussion, some haggling about price, and then 
an agreement cane to. This is the normal course of most private contract 
sales. She was nonetheless a willing seller because she had not 
previously put the property into the hands of an agent for sale. She was 
willing to sell at a price, she was offered a price less than the maximum 
which the intending purchasers were willing to give, and she took it.'
It is also true that the so called willing vendor is a person who must sell: 
'he cannot simply call of the sale if he does not like the price, but there 
must be on the other side a willing purchaser, so that the conditions of the 
sale must be such as to induce in him a willing frame of mind.'41
Thus, what should be remembered by valuers is that both the hypothetical 
buyer and the hypothetical seller should be willing, but neither should be 
anxious. It is not sufficient to rely only upon a buyer's maximum price, 
not only upon a seller's minimum price. The valuer must consider both buyer 
and seller and endeavour to determine whether their ideas should meet.
In more than one of his Australian High Court judgments, Williams J. has 
criticized the tendency of witnesses to assume that what a willing purchaser 
of shares (with a choice of alternative investments) would have paid, was 
synonymous with what a willing vendor could reasonably expect to obtain.
His dictum in McCathie's case42 was that the test of market value 
'though valuable and persuasive, is by no means final or conclusive, and it 
should not be used so as to depress the value of property by exaggerating
41 Lord Guest in He Winter (Sutherlands Trustees) v IRC (1961) 40 ATC 361 
at 369
42 McCathie v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 1
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temporary disadvantages to which it is subject at the date of valuation, and 
failing to give proper weight to its more permanent advantages.1
In aligning this statement with the concept of the willing buyer and willing 
seller, he reasoned in the following way:
'It is true that in order to arrive at the value of shares at the date of 
death the courts have often applied the same test as that which they have 
applied in the assessment of compensation upon the compulsory purchase of 
property, which is to ascertain the price which a reasonably willing 
vendor should be agreeable to accept and which a reasonably willing 
purchaser should be agreeable to pay for the property in its actual 
condition at the time of expropriation with all its existing advantages 
and with all its possibilities. But at the date of death no 
expropriation in fact takes place. The executors have the executor's 
year to realize the property and the Court of Equity can always sanction 
a postponement if the executors consider that ’t is inadvisable to sell 
during that year and require protection against the creditors. So far as 
the beneficiaries are concerned there may be a power of postponement in 
the will, and if there is not there is a statutory power ... The shares 
may not require to be sold at all in the due course of administration.
The Court has to ascertain the real value of the shares at the date of 
death and the market value is not always the same as the real value.'
This test of real value was acknowledged by Gibbs J in Gregory v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation.43
Thus the executors need not suffer the disability of a forced sale if the 
marketable value is less than what they consider to be the real value.
One of the other factors which may cause divergence between market value and 
real value is that the former is not always based upon a full knowledge of
43 (1971) 123 CLR 547
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the facts by both parties. Real value is presumed to be calculated with a 
knowledge of all relevant data, and on the assumption that the hypothetical 
buyer and seller each have the same knowledge*
The Accountants' Handbook (USA) indicates a similar general approach in 
America, where 'to appraise a security means essentially to determine a fair 
market value'. Fair market value is defined as 'the price which would be 
arrived at under the conditions obtaining as a result of negotiations 
between a willing and informed buyer and a willing and informed seller.
This conception excludes forced sale or liquidation value.'
In summing up, the willing buyer - willing seller concept is in principle a 
simple one based on the thesis the.1' a common price will be acceptable to 
both parties to the transaction. In practice it gives rise to frequent 
difficulties, especially in the case of property of a highly speculative 
nature. In many such cases it may seem at first sight that a purchaser 
would be prepared to give little or nothing for the asset. On the other 
hand it may be argued that the vendor would not be willing to part for a 
song with an asset which could turn out to be of considerable value; and 
that he would rather take his chance by declining to sell at all, Similar 
considerations can also arise in a modified degree in the case of shares in 
a family company, where the apparent worth to the deceased (as a member of 
the family) may seem at first sight to exceed the price which a purchaser 
outside the family would be prepared to pay.
Could it be argued that the price must tie that which the purchaser is 
prepared to pay? It is subnitted that this argument is fallacious. A sale 
would be equally out of the question if the price were too low for the 
vendor. There is no justification for favouring one party rather- than the 
other: indeed, quite apart from the specific references in the authorities 
to willing vendor and willing purchaser, the whole conception of an open 
market implies freedom of choice by all concerned. And it is abundantly
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clear from the decided cases that the statutory basis involves an equal 
degree of willingness on both sides. The crux of the matter in a given case 
is - ‘what is a fair price under all the circumstances?' If at the outset 
it seems that the views of vendor and purchaser might differ on this 
question, it must be assumed that there will be reasonable negotiations on 
equal terns continuing until a settlement is reached.
Tine of hypothetical sale
The Estate Duty Act provides that the value of
(1) quoted shares not sold in the course of liquidation of the 
estate44; and
(2) unquoted shares'^
to be included in the estate is the fair market value thereof as at the 
date of death of the deceased.
In the estate duty case of Duke of Buccleuch46, Dord Reid said that it
'must mean the price which the property would have fetched if sold at the 
time of death. I agree with the argument of the respondents that "at the 
time of death" points to a definite time - the day on which the death 
occurred: it does not xean withi; a reasonable time after the death,'
Later on he continued^-?
'But here what mast be envisaged is a sale in the open market on a 
particular day. So there is not room for supposing that the owner would 
do, as many prudent owners do - withdraw the property if he does not get 
a sufficient offer and wait until a time when he can get a batter offer. 
The conrnissioners roust estimate what the property would probably have 
fetched on that particular day if it had been exposed for sale, no doubt 
after such advance publicity as would have been reasonable.'
44 Section 5 (l)(g)
45 Section 5(1)(f) bis
46 (1967) AC 506 at 524
47 Supra footnote 46 at 525
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Although it is clear that the property must be valued at the time oE death, 
the question arises as to how much reliance can be placed on prior and 
subsequent sales in arriving at the fair market value.
Prior sales
It is possible that previous arm's length sales may have been affected which 
tray be taken into account in a subsequent valuation. In practice, however, 
the number of cases tend to be few and far between.
Nevertheless, in the Irish estate duty case of McNamee v IRC49, Thomas 
McNamee at the time of his death owned 175 ordinary shares out of 50 000 
ordinary shares in issue in the Convoy Woollen Company Limited.
Mr McNulty, the solicitor of the company, gave evidence as follows:
'I purchased 150 of these shares in 1946 at £150. Registration no 248. 
The parties were at arm's length. The dividend was 10%. Registration no 
261. That was a sale at arm's length. Weir to Carlass, May 1949; J R 
Weir to IB Carless, 777 ordinary shares for H971. 5s.Od. Registration no 
266, 19 March 1951, Raphoe Electric Light Co> John Moffat, 100 ordinary 
shares of £125. They were at arm's length. 19 September 1951, the 
McNamee sale was registered. In January 1951, the MacNamee sale was 
negotiated by me. It was not registered until the September following, 
registration no 269. It was the best price I could get. Mr Kilpatrick 
had recently been appointed a director. He wanted shares. He knew of 
the sale of Carless and he offered the same price. I am certain he 
couldn’t have got them at that price. This sale at El. 10s. Od. was at 
arm's length. It was a completely commercial transaction. I am 
solicitor to the company and I know a fair amount about its affairs. In 
ordinary cases I would consult the secretary as to the sale. That didn't 
happen in this case. I knew Mr Kilpatrick wanted the shres. We had a 
bit of a haggle. I pushed him to £1. 10s.Od. I couldn't get any more at
49 (1954) IR 214
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all. The most I could get was the £1. 10s. Od. I did not hawk them 
around. It was a sale to the most probable purchaser. The directors 
knew the shares were for sale. I got the highest price in the history of 
the company.1
In his judgment, Maguire J stated:
'Accepting Me McNulty's evidence as to the bona fides of the sale of 
these shares to Mr Kilpatrick and granting that this price of £1, 10s. is 
the highest ever paid for these shares in the history of the company, I 
still must bear in mind that this was not a sale in any real or any 
imaginary open market. I must make allowances for the sale in an 
imaginary open market. It is here I find evidence of Mr Shott and Mr 
Butler of great value. I have given anxious thought and consideration to 
this, perhaps in seme ways the most difficult part of my task. I am 
satisfied that not more tnan el. 12s. 6d, certainly not more than that, 
might have been obtained in the open market, an imaginary open market, 
for this lot of 175 shares. Accordingly I fix and determine the value of 
these shares at El. 12s. 6d each.'
subsequent Sales
Although it appears that a previous arm's length may be taken into account 
j.n a subsequent valuation (McNamee's case), the interesting question arises 
as to whether a subsequent sale after the date of valuation, give grounds to 
re-open and amend the earlier valuations.
One of the leading estate duty cases on this point, althought not dealing 
with shares, is that of IRC v Mart's Trustees^, A herd of cattle, 
belonging to Mr Marr who died on 7 June 1904, were valued on 20 June 1904 at 
E9 G31 by Mr H Ritchie. The herd wsas subsequently sold at an auction sale 
on 11 October 1904 for £17 722.
SO (1906) 44 SLT 647
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T'ne Conmissioner argued that the price fetched in the open market, when t/ie 
herd was exposed for sale within four months after the deceased's death, 
afforded a reasonable and proper criterion of value of this portion of the 
deceased's estate. They further argued that the amount actually realised 
formed and fell to be treated as an important asset of the estate, allowance 
being made for such outlay as was incurred by the defenders, as executors, 
in the ko^p and care of the herd. The balance, after making this allowance, 
represented truly the value of the herd at the deceased's death.
Lord Johnston drew a distinction between property which was subject to 
considerable fluctuation in value and that, such as a house, where a 
valuation was apparently considerably easier. The judgment is useful in 
highlighting the different factors which may be applicable at the date of 
valuation and not at the subsequent sale.
'in the case of house property, at any rate, there is a natural time of 
the year which is regarded as the proper property market, and unless a 
house has some special attractions it can hardly be said that there is an 
open market say/ in the month of August, should that be the time of the 
deceased's death. Though the house may not be actually saleable then, 
yet valuea change so gradually, that there is no difficulty in a skilled 
valuator putting a proper value upon the house even in August with his 
knowledge of past markets and present prospects. There will be no 
substantial change in the intrinsic value of the house between August/ 
when it may have to be valued and the following February, when it may 
have to be sold for entry at the ensuing May.
But when one comes to deal with a subject of a fluctuating value, the 
fluctuation depending upon natural increment or rather on the excess or 
otherwise of natural increment over natural decrement, a different 
question arises. Such a subject is a herd of cattle. It is in the 
definite ascertainable condition at the date of the deceased's death.
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But in the lapse of months important changes take place. At the date of 
the death a cow may be two or three weeks from calving. In the course of 
three or four months the risks of calving and the risks to the life of 
the youno calf are over. The ccw in calf is one thing, the cow and her 
calf on its feet and three or four months old is a totally different 
thing. Again a calf a few weeks old at the date of the death and a calf 
sane months old at a date posterior to the death are also very different 
things. The calf it over the troubles of its early weeks and every month 
is developing rrore or its quality. Similarly a cow may have been put to 
the bull shortly before the death and in the course of three or four 
months may E'-ove either to be barren or to be in calf. Again losses by 
death occur from time to time, and cattle which may be perfectly healthy 
at the date of the death of the owner may either singly or as a herd be 
afflicted with disease rendering them valueless at the end of three or 
four months. It is, 1 think, therefore obvious that to call for a 
valuation (and no valuation can be better than actual exposure to ca1® by 
auction) at.a date three or four months posterior to the date of death 
would not give the true value of the herd at the date which the statute 
itself fixes viz, the date of the death.
Now if what I have already said would be true of an ordinary herd of 
catt le it is true to a greatly enhanced degree in the ease of a herd of 
prize cattle, whose risks and whose variations in individual value are 
extreme in degree when compared with those of an ordinary herd.
Moreover, if what I have said above is true generally there could not be 
two periods in the year better suited to display the difference in values 
than the dates with which we are concerned, viz 7 June and 11 October.
In June the herd is in a transition state. The majority of the calfs 
havs been recently dropped, sane of the cows are uncalfed and the herd 
has had none of the benefits of a summer's grass. By October the 
conditions of the herd is set for the season, the cattle have, in 
agricultural phrase, got the bloom on them, and there can be no question
that in the interests of the estate the trustees acted prudently in 
taking the risk of carrying the herd through the stunner and selling it in 
October, rather than selling it at once, end they also acted prudently in 
not taking the risk of carrying it through the winter and selling it in 
February which is the other chief market month for prize cattle, and when 
if everything had gone well the herd would have been of still greater 
intrinsic value, though I doubt whether it would have met as good a 
market.
Even if I had not considered the special circumstances to be iirmediately 
adverted to, I should have no hesitation in stating that the herd must be 
valued at the date on the death, though it might have been imprudent to 
bring it to the hammer until three or four months later, and that the 
Ccnmissioners of Inland Revenue were not entitled to have a valuation as 
in October, when the best market may be anticipated, or a valuation based 
on the results of actual sale at that period.'
It would appear that the price realised in the subsequent auction was itself 
exceptional and this was a further reason for rejecting any attempt to drop 
back from the subsequent sale price to arrive at the value in June. As Lord 
Johnston stated:
'1 think that the sale which actually did take place in October was 
accompanied by certain adventitious circumstances which, though they 
rebounded very much to the advantage of the estate, render the Sale price 
obtained a misleading criterion of the true market value of the herd at 
the date of the death, or indeed at any other date.
Also, in the estate duty case of Re Holt^l, Danckwerts J stated:
I rule out of consideration the knowledge provided by the passage of time 
since March 11 1948, that the company's dividend on ordinary shares has
51 (1953) 32 ATC 402 at 410
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not *'--2n increased from 5% and that the company has been able to avoid a 
public issue of ordinary shares by launching an exceedingly successful 
issue of new preference shares in September 1950.1
It appears, therefore, that events subsequent to the valuation date have to 
be ignored. However, it is submitted that information arising after the 
date of valuation may nevertheless help to shed light on the position at 
that date.
In the estate duty case of The Trustees of Johan Thomas Salvesen v IRC52 
Lord Fleming stated:
'I quite recognise that the problem I have to deal with must be solved in 
the light of the information available at or about the time of the 
testator's death. I think that, however, does not debar me completely 
from making any reference to the balance sheet at 31 July 1927 which 
includes a period of nearly three months prior to the testator's death 
(24 October 1926).’
l‘n the cases of Rs Bradberry National Bank Ltd v Bradberry, and in Re Fry, 
Tasker v Gulliford53, although not dealing with the valuation of shares, 
Uthwatt, J stated:
'It was held by the Court of Appeal that although the moment at which the 
damages in a case ... are to be fixed is the moment of death, that did 
not mean that the court was to shut its eyes to subsequent happenings and 
that the court could, in assessing damages, inform its mind of 
circumstances which had arisen since the cause of action accrued and 
which threw light on the realities of the case.4
And later he proceeds:
52 (1930) 9 ATC 43 at 51
53 (1943) 1 Ch 35 at 44
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'A principle is to be drawn frcm these authorities, namely, that where 
facts are available they are to be preferred to prophecies.’
The use of hindsight lias- also been an issue m  two important Canadian tax 
cases heard before the Federal Court of Appeal in recant years, each dealing 
with publicly traded securities. One is the decision of National System of 
yaking of Alberta Limited v The Queen54 and the other is The Queen v 
I,ittler.55 Both cases involved a formal takeover within months of the 
valuation date at a price two to three times m  excess of the quoted trading 
price.
In National System of Baking (at the Trial Division level), Mahoney J 
stated:
'I expressly rejected the validity of hindsight as probative jf fair 
market value at a given date and took nothing that occurred after 
Valuation Day into account.'
In Littler, the use of hindsight is contrasted with the availability of 
facts existing at the vauation date. Two out of the three justices in this 
case were of the view that the fair market value of the subject shares was 
the eventual takeover price, not the stock market price on the valuation 
date, such view being without the benefit of hindsight. The Court of Appeal 
confirmed the decision of Decary 3 of the Federal Court - irial Division. 
Dubinsky DJ (dissenting) stated:
'... with deference, therefore, to the contrary view of the learned trial 
Judge, thfc Minister had every reason to attribute to the value of a 
share in Downey's a figure of $68,22 quite apart from what eventually 
took place in May, 1968 ... As far as the Minister's decision is 
concerned, it was not, in my opinion, a case of hindsight at all.
54 (1978) CTC 30; 78 OTC 6018
55 (1978) CTC 235; 78 DTC 6179
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It was based on substantial facts existing prior to the transaction 
challenged herein'
This again indirectly raises the aspect of informed parties in the concept 
of fair market value, viz the willing buyer - willing seller principle.
CHAPTER 5
MAJORITY AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDINGS
introduction
Considered at large, control must signify a power vesting in seme person or 
group to direct the business and affairs of a company. This power may have 
a legal foundation as, for instance, where it is exercised by means of a 
majority holding of the company's issued voting share capital, or by a 
contractual right. Control may also exist in fact in a number of informal 
ways as, Sor example, where the economic or other circumstances in which a 
company is placed allow control to be exercised by someone holding only a 
minority of shares, or perhaps none at all. De facto control is an even 
more elusive concept than legal control, but while it may be as effective as 
any form of legal control, it may always be overridden by legal control. 
Control of either variety is no less real because it is infrequently 
exercised, as it is always available to the controller whenever he chooses 
to use it.
Corporate control is control ever the company as a whole, and only 
indirectly over its assets, decisions and activities, because the ownership 
of a share is not a proportionate ownership of the corporate property.
Subject to the specific and general restraints on the freedom of a 
controlling shareholder, control (or a controlling interest) is for most 
purposes said to exist when the shareholder holds shares which, taken 
together, carry 50 per cent plus one of the total votes which may be cast on 
an ordinary resolution at a shareholders' meeting. A shareholder with such 
voting paver will generally be sole to elect all the directors (including 
himself) and, through them, to govern the company's business. A 
shareholding insufficient to accomplish this is described as a minority 
interest. If the shareholder has enough voting power to pass a special 
resolution, he will also be able to determine another range of matters which 
require such a majority. If the shareholder owns 100 per cent of the voting
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of the voting shares he may have absolute control.
It appears that in most countries, there is no statutory definition of 
'control1 and the meaning must be found in the principles developed in case 
law. Most of the case lav? has arisen under income tax legislation, and it 
is these cases which are discussed below.
Legal Control
United Kingdom jurisprudence has uniformly held that control means control 
by legal means and, more, that legal control springs from the constitution 
of the company itself. The basic rule was laid down by Rowlatt, J. in BW 
Noble Ltd v IRC1:
'It seems to me that "controlling interest" is a phrase that has a 
certain well known meaning; it means the man whose shareholding in the 
Company is such that he is the shareholder who is more powerful than all 
the other shareholders put together in General Meeting.'
Although it is clear that legal control turns on ownership of voting shares, 
it is necessary to go further and examine the matters on which those shares 
may be voted. In the Canadian case of Buckerfield's Ltd et al v MNr2 nhe 
Court spoke of a majority of the votes in the election of the board of 
directors. The power to elect directors is probably the most important 
criterion with which to assess the importance of voting power because, in 
the usual situation, directors are also given broad authority to manage the 
company. If this is so, the vesting of some specific and limited management 
authority elsewhere may not impair the control. But the Court in Donald 
Applicators Ltd et al v Mnr3 said that the reasoning in the Buckerfield's 
case would apply only when the directors had the usual powers of directors.
In the Donald Applicators case a company had issued 2 -Class A and 490 Class 
B shares. Both classes carried full voting rights except that the class B
1 (1926) 12 TC 911 at 926
2 (1965) 1 EX CR 299; (1964) CTC 504; 64 DIC 5301
3 (1969) CTC 98; 69 BTC 5122; aff'd (1971) CTC 402; 71 DTC 5202
-54-
shares had no right to vote in an election of directors. The court refused 
to accept the argument that the class A shares controlled the company 
because they had tho exclusive right to elect directors. Instead, the court 
looked at the realities, noting the the directors could issue no shares 
without the consent of all shareholders and that the class B shareholders 
could at any time amend the company's consitution to strip the directors of 
all powers and vest in the shareholders the entire authority to manage the 
company.
Similarly, two directors holding two-thirds of the voting shares did not 
have control of a corporation when the corporation's constitution provided 
that shareholders' resolutions had to be unanimous and that a quorum at both 
shareholders' and directors' meetings was three because the third 
shareholder-director could frustrate any matter proposed by the other 
two.4
It is interesting to note that the judge in the Donald Applicators case 
expressly declined to take account of the de facto control possesed by the 
class B shareholders, and he also said that the fact that the directors 
performed no important functions and deferred entirely to the manager 
appointed by the class B shareholders did not in itself establish that 
control did not rest with the class A shares.
In Oak fie Id Developments (Toronto) Ltd v mnr5 the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that a corporation was controlled by its common shareholders (even 
though 50 per cent of the total 'otes was vested in a class of voting 
preferred shares), because the preferred shares had only a restricted 
(albeit prior) right to dividends and to shares in assets upon liquidation, 
and liquidation could lie effected by a 50 per cent vote of all shareholders.
As discussed earlier, control may also vest in a shareholder or shareholders 
through a casting vote, intermediate companies, trustees and nominees,
4 Fairgreen Investments Ltd v MNR (1972) CTC 2446; 72 ETC 1374
5 (1971) SCR 1032? (1971) CTC 281; 71 DIG 5175
voting agreements, powers of attorney, group control, etc. For the purposes 
o£ this paper, it is not deemed necessary to deal with these at length,
It remains, however to briefly discuss the incident of ownership of control.
property in Control
, has been customary to assume that any value attaching to a controlling 
block of shares over and above the value of the shares themselves is an 
incident of the ownership of the block. The control premium which the owner 
of a.controlling block of shares might be able to command on a sale is that 
shareholder’s property, and he is not accountable to the corporation or to 
the other shareholders for any part of it. As lord Uthwatt expressed it:6
',.. if some one shareholder held a number of shares sufficient to carry 
control of the company, it might /;ell be that the value proper to be 
attributed to his holding under the regulation was greater than the sum 
of the values that would be attributable to the shares comprised in that 
holding if they were split between various persons. The reason is that 
he has something to sell - control - which the others considered 
separately have not. The contention of the appellants, if accepted, 
would, as the Court of Appeal point out, deny him the real value of his 
holding.'
Nevertheless, many argue that 'control' should proper y be regarded as a 
corporate asset and that all shareholders should enjoy -ateably the proceeds 
of its sale.7 The American case of Perlman v Feldman,R vhile it did not 
explicitly adopt the 'corporate asset' theory, did conclude that the
6 Shoit V Treasury Commissioners (1948) AC 534; (1948) 2 All ER 509 at S13 
(All ER)
7 See Gower, Modern Company Law 3rd ed p546, 578; Andrews, 'The 
stockholders right to equal opportunity in the sale of shares', (1965) 78 
Harv LR 505
8 219 F 2d 173; cert denied 349 OS 952 (1955)
9 The case was remanded for a determination of the value - of the selling 
price of $20 share, $14,67 was determined to be the fair market value at 
the date of sale, so that the control premium was $5,33 per share.
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minority shareholders were entitled to share in the premium received by the 
seller of a block of shares (37% of the total) which carried effective 
control.9 The circumstances in Perlman v Feldman were unusual in that the 
company whose shares vere sold was a steel producer at a time (during the 
Korean War*) when supplies of steel were scarce and producers were exercising 
restraint or) prices. The purchaser was a steel user, and the premium price 
paid for the shares was an indirect payment for a supply of steel. Thus, 
the court characterized the sale of shares as, in part, a sale of the 
company's product. Looked at in this way, the minority shareholders were 
really sharing in a profit resulting from a high demand for the product of 
their corporation, and the controlling shareholder, as a fiduciary, could 
not appropriate that profit to himself.
Fiduciary obligations were also imposed upon controlling shareholders in 
Jones v Ahanson.10 and Rosenfeld v Black1-!. However, many other 
decisions in the United States have not adopted the rationale of Rosenfeld v 
Black.
In South Africa there has not yet been a case in which a seller of control 
has been required to account to other shareholders for a premium obtained, 
whether on a theory that control is a corporate asset or as an incident of 
the seller's fiduciary obligation. However, in Canada there have been 
suggestion that an argument to that effect would be sympathetically 
entertained.12 securities commissions in Canada have refused permission 
to transfer escrowed controlling shares without a takeover bid under which 
all shareholders accepting the bid would be entitled to receive the same 
price, i.i the Ontario Securities Commission proposed amendments to Bill 75 
(the Securities Act, 1974) the definition of an exempt offer which is not 
subject to the general takeover bid rules no longer contains an exemption 
for a private agreement entered into by 15 or more shareholders. The effect 
of this deletion means that a takeover bid would presumably have to be made 
to all shareholders and that all shareholders would share equally in a sale.
f 10 (1069) 1 Cal 3d 93; 460 P 2d 464 (1969)
11 445 F 2d 1337 (1971)
12 Re R  J Jowsey Mining Co Ltd (1969) 2 0  R  549; (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 97
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principles of valuation
Both the courts and valuation carmen tators have tended to deal obliquely 
with the valuation of control, on the part of the courts this may be 
because so little has been written on this topic. Certainly the various 
aspects of control as they might affect value have not been discussed per 
se, nor has there been an attempt made to suggest methods by which the value 
of control might, in certain circumstances, be quantified. There has, 
however, been general recognition that control can have value in and of 
itself. For example, in Gold Coast Section Trust Ltd v Humphrey,13 Lord 
Siroon said, "there may also be value in control", and, in Short v Treasury 
Commissioners,14 which came out most clearly for a premium for control, 
the Court said when referring to the position of a shareholder with 
effective control:15
It may well be that the value to be attributed to that holding (one 
shareholder with effective control), on a sale of it as a separate 
transaction, is a figure greater than the sum arrived at by multiplying 
the number of his shares by the market value for the time being of a 
single share. In such a case the shareholder in question, it may be 
said, has and is able to call something more than a mere parcel oii 
shares, each having the rights as to dividend and otherwise conferred 
upon it by the company's regulations.
In Dean v Prince^ the Court seemed to relate the ability to control to 
valuing the business in question on a going concern basis, rather than on a 
break-up basis as had been the approach of the auditor called in to 
arbitrate between dissenting shareholders. It can be argued in both this 
case and Short that the courts concluded that a rateable value should attach 
to control shares and that minority interests would generally have a lower
13 (1948) 2 All ER 379 (HL)
14 (1948) 1 KB 116 (CA), aff'd (1948) AC 534 (HL)
15 The premium suggested by the Court could be either a premium over market 
price for control, recognition that the public market price was not 
representative of underlying value, or a combination of these two 
factors.
16 (1953) 1 Ch 590
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value than a rateable value no matter what basis was used to determine such 
minority value.
Under ordinary circumstances a majority shareholding in a company conferring 
voting control should be valued by reference to the value of the net assets 
of the company!’7, due allowance being made where appropriate for the tax 
liability which would arise in the hands of a shareholder on the 
distribution of the company's reserves upon its winding up. The practice o£ 
making such an allowance in valuing shares for fiscal purposes is well 
accepted by the Department of inland Revenue which normally accepts a 
deduction of 33,3 per cent of a company's distributable reserves.
The Share Valuation Division in the United Kingdom considers that a majority 
holding of isora than 50 per cent and less than 75 per cent of the voting 
captial is one which should be valued by reference to the overall value of 
the company based on either ernings or net assets as appropriate, subject to 
a discount to allow for the fact that the entire company is not on the 
iiiarket although a control holding is.
When.the figure of 75% or more of the voting shares is reached, it is 
indisputable that the whole value off the company on an earnings or assets 
basis, as appropriate, and as calculated above, is the correct method of 
valuation.
In the case of a minority shareholding, a valuation based on the net value 
of the company's assets is only appropriate if the company has disposed of 
its business and is in the course of winding up.18
The paramount tV*.;?■ -.-r in fixing the price which a hypothetical willing 
purchaser woulu ,viy ,* a hypothetical willing seller the estimated 
dividend yield. T!fo main tearing that the asset payition has on the
17 M'tonne Is? Trustees v ClR (1927) SO1 14
18 Re court hope 0928) 7 53fi
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hypothetical market price arises from the degree of security which the 
purchaser may expect; where the asset backing is high a purchaser would 
normally be prepared to accept a somewhat lower return than he would 
ordinarily require.
These principles, as well as the invidious position in which a minority 
shareholder in a private company could find himself, are illustrated by the 
remarks of James J in Estate Duty Case No 1:19
'Inquiry would have satisfied (a purchaser) that the private ccnpany was 
essentially a family one in which family loyalty and interest would make 
it extremely difficult for a minority shareholder to influence policy to 
the extent of forcing a liquidation in order to obtain a share of the 
capital of the company, or to sell the whole business, lock, stock and 
barrel as a going concern. Thus an intending purchaser would have 
realized that he could have but little expectation of financial profit 
from a disposal of the company's assets, because such disposition in the 
reasonably foreseeable future was very unlikely ... while the court 
agrees that the rtrong asset position of the company is a factor to which 
due weight must be given, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that 
unless there is a draitiatic change in the professed policy of the company, 
it seems unlikely that any shareholder or potential shareholder can hope 
to receive any direct advantage as a result of the sale of the assets 
either in whole or in part within the foreseeable future ... the main 
bearing that the asset position has on the market price is brought about 
by the fact that any investment made will be well secured, and that a 
potential investor because of this, may be ready to accept a somewhat 
lower return on his money than he would normally require. The business 
is exceptionally sound, financially strong, well managed and has 
excellent prospects and in the court's view an investor knowing all the 
facts might well be prepared to accept a lower immediate return on his 
investment,'
19 (1958) 23 SATC 362
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Another case which illustates the principles involved in valuing a minority 
shareholing is the Australian case of Gregory v Federal Commissioner of 
T axation.20 The deceased owned a minority holding in a private company 
which in turn owned directly and indirectly a substantial shareholding in a 
quoted company. The Commissioner contended that the rate of capitalization 
to be applied in valuing the deceased's shareholding should be determined by 
taking the arithmetic average yield on the underlying quoted investment.
The court rejected this argument and approved the fundamental principles to 
be applied as stated in an earlier case, Commissioner of Succession Duties 
(SA) v Executor Trustee & Agency Co of South Australia Ltd21 in the 
following terms:
'the main items to be taken into account in estimating the value of 
shares are the earning power of the company and the value of the capital 
assets in which the shareholders' money is invested. But a prudent 
purchaser does not buy shares in a company which is a going concern with 
a view of winding it up, so that the more important item is the 
determination of the probable profit which the company may reasonably be 
expected to make ir, the future, because dividends can only be paid out of 
profits and a prudent purchaser would be interested mainly in the future 
dividends which he would reasonably expect to receive on his investment.'
The court in the Gregory case went on to say that:
' If the shareholding to be valued is a majority shareholding the value o£ 
the underlying assets may assume great importance. Where, however, one 
is requited to make a valuation of a minority shareholding in a company 
(company A) which holds a very substantial parcel of shares in a public 
company (company B), and when company A is so controlled that it appears 
probable, if not certain, that it will, notwithstanding the fluctuations 
of the market, retain its shares in company B, it would be quite unreal 
to say that a prudent purchaser of shares in company A would necessarily
20 (1971) 2 ATR 33
21 (1947) 74 CLR 358
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expect to pay a price which would give a yield no greater than that 
produced by company B» because on becoming a shareholder in company A he 
would not enjoy all the advantages available to a shareholder in company 
B, and in particular would not be able to obtain the capital gain that 
would result from a favourable realization of the shares in the latter 
company.'
This principle was upheld in a later and recent case of the High Court of 
Australia, Executors of the Estate of M.C. Crane v Federal Ccmmissioner of 
T a x a t i o n 2 2 where the facts were very similar to those in the Gregory 
case.
The depreciatory effect of a minority shareholding in a private compat. ■ was 
also brought out in Holt & others v Inland Revenue C c m m i s s i o n e r s 23 where 
Danckwerts J in his judgment said:
‘The shares did not give a purchaser the opportunity to control the 
company, or to influence the policy of the directors to any great extent 
... any purchaser therefore would be dependent on the policy of the 
directors, so long as they should have the support of the general body of 
the shareholders. I think that the kind of investor who would purchase 
shares in a private company of this kind, in circumstances which must 
preclude disposing of his shares freely whenever he should wish (because, 
when registered as a shareholder, he will be subject to the provisions of 
the articles restricting transfer), would be different from any common 
kind of purchaser of shares on the stock exchange, and would be rather 
the exceptional kind of investor who had seme special reason for putting 
his money into shares of this kind. He would, in my view, be the kind of 
investor who would not rush hurriedly into the transaction ... ’
In ITC 932^4 the appellant received a minority shareholding in a private 
property company as consideration for services rendered. The president of
22 (1974) 5 ATK 171
23 (1953) 2 All ER 1499
24 (1961) 24 SATC 341
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the court considered that the right way to value shares in a private company 
was by reference to the break-up value of its assets. It is submitted that 
this is incorrect for a minority shareholding although it should be noted 
that the accountant called on behalf of the appellant somewhat surprisingly 
valued the shares in question by reference to the underlying value of the 
assets of the company. Accountants caimonly value minority holdings for 
fiscal purposes in this way, making some allowance, usually 10 per cent, for 
the fact that the shares constitute a minority holding. However, it must be 
pointed out that, except for the doubtful authority of ITC 932, this method 
of valuation is not supported by any other legal precedents.
The Shares Valuation Division in the United Kingdom draws a distinction 
between 'small' minority holdings and 'influential' minority holdings.
Snail minority holdings are those of less than 25 per cent in which it is 
accepted that a holder can do little to influence the running of the company 
and would not have a right to a seat on the board. He would therefore be 
primarily concerned with the yield he would receive on his investment and 
the shares should be valued on the basis of a dividend yield if a dividend 
is paid, but with sane regard paid to earnings or on an earnings yield or 
price earnings ratio basis if there is no dividend. If pressed however the 
Shares Valuation division can usually be persuaded to accept the method of 
arriving at a notional reasonable distribution and discounting that figure 
by say, 50 per cent.
Holdings of more than 25 per cent but less than 50 per cent is considered to 
be influential minority holdings, where the shareholder can Mock a special 
resolution. Although it is accepted that, in practice, t is ability to 
block a special resolution is unlikely to have of itself a significant 
value, it is true that the value per share would be higher than for a small 
minority holding. The Revenue view is that such holdings should be valued 
on a basis which gives the greatest weight to the price earnings ratio, less
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weight to the actual dividend paid and the weight to be attributed to the 
net assets value to be dependant on the size of the holding. Net assets 
value has a greater influence on the value of a 49,9 per cent holding than 
on the value of a 25,1 per cent holding. This is a not unreasonable method 
of valuation.
in practice, when it is remembered that the dividend yield required when 
there is a 'consistent reasonable dividend' should also take into account 
the size and the influence of the holding within the company, and that 
dividend yields of comparable companies (based on the sales of small 
minority holdings) would need to be reduced to allow for- the size of the 
holding involved, there would be little, if any difference between a 
dividend orientated and an earnings orientated valuation.
50 per cent holding
In the case of a 50 per cent holding it could be argued, that although there 
would be a potential deadlock if the other shares were held by another 50 
per cent shareholder, there would nonetheless be an assumption following the 
judgment in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd54, that the shareholders 
would act for their mutual benefit and the valuation should be by reference 
to the company as a w, ole.
If, however, the other 50 per cent of the shares are held in small numbers 
by a*; her shareholders, then clearly the 50 per cent shareholder has de facto 
but no de jure control. Value by reference to the company as a whole, 
however, is again reasonable. Obviously this approach results in a discount 
on the going concern value of the company provided, on the assumption that 
the company is a going concern.
One area which can give a particular problem in practice is where there is 
an equality of shareholdings and as to whether as a result there is complete 
deadlock or a particular shareholder has control. Such a case was that of
54 (1972) 2 All ER 492
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IRC v B W Noble Ltd55. In this case Mr Noble held 500 out of 1 000 
ordinary shares. However he was also chairman of the company and as Rowlatt 
J stated in judgment at 926:
'Now this gentlanan has judt half the number of shares but those shares 
in the circumstances of this case are reinforced by the position that he 
occupies of chairman. A position that he occupies not merely by the 
votes of the other shareholders or of his directors elected by the 
shareholders, but by contract and so reinforced in as much as he has a 
casting vote he does control the general meetings, there is no question 
about that, and in as much as he does possess at least half of the shares 
he can prevent any modifications taking place in the constitution of the 
ccrapany which would undermine his position as chairman,'
The judge had no hesitation in holding therefore that Mr Noble controlled 
the ccnpany.
In Re W F  Courthope (deceased)56, the deceased owned 50 per cent of the 
ordinary shares and almost 50 per cent of the preference shares. The 
company in question had disposed of all its assets but was not in 
liquidation. Rowlatt j took a highly practical approach. Declining to 
value the shares on a dividend return basis he felt that there was some 
possibility that the purchaser of the shares in question might be able to 
carpel a winding up but that there was considerable uncertainty. Taking 
into account that a prospective purchaser would require a profit on his 
investment of seme 50 per cent, he discounted the value of the shares 
calculated by reference to the net assets of the company by 33,3 per cent.
A roughly similar approach was taken in an American case, Obermer v United 
States57 although the position in that case was complicated by the fact 
that if liquidation of the company took place, capital gains tax<-s would be 
payable.
55 (1926) 12 TC 911
56 7 ATC 538
57 238 F Supp 29 (1964)
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There is much to be said for the view that a 50 per cent shareholding should 
oe valued on a dividend return basis with, perhaps, sane premium where a 
majority valuation would result in a higher value per share than that 
obtained in a minority valuation to take account of the potential for some 
profit in the event of a winding up - 'a. prudent purchaser does not buy 
shares in a company which is a going concern with a view to winding it 
up'.58 yJhile a 50 per cent holding can block ordinary and special 
resolutions it does not enable the holder to apply to court for a compulsory 
winding up under s 344(a) of the companies Act of 1973; nor would it entitle 
the holder to bring about the voluntary winding up of the company in terms 
of s 349(b) of that Act. The valuation of a 50 per cent shareholding in a 
company presents perhaps one of the most difficult problems involved in the 
valuation field.
58 Gregory v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 2 ATR 33 at 45
CHAPTER 6
THE BLOCKAGE DOCTRINE
The blockage doctrine concerns the determination of the proper value of 
large blocks of quoted shares. When the block in question is very large 
relative to the nornal trading volume on the market, its value differs from 
that obtained by simply multiplying the number of shares by the market price 
per share. This phenomenon, in fact, is not unique to the valuation of 
shares; blockage could be pertinent in almost any valuation problem*
The question of an allowance for blockage has occurred only once in a 
reported South African case. In Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CirI the 
question arose as to how one million shares in a certain company quoted on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, should be valued. In finding that the 
determination of the value of shares for tax purposes is a question of fact 
the court went on to say that 'the value of the shares on the (revelant 
date) must, of course, be ascertained by enquiring whav price could have 
been obtained for them, by adopting sane reasonable method of sale on that 
date. To throw the whole million shares on the Johannesburg market on a 
given date would obviously be the worst possible way of gauging their value. 
Both common sense and the evidence suggest that the quotation would became 
fictitious or nil long before the major portion of the shares were sold ... 
there are obviously other methods of effecting a sale of shares wholesale 
than by throwing tl. m all on the open market, what has to be looked for is 
a person who is willing to buy wholesale at a price under the retail price 
of the stock exchange quotation. He would get his profit over a period by 
retail sales. Such buyer would certainly toe influenced by the stability and 
firmness of the stock exchange daily quotation and would normally buy at 
something under that quotation'
Where the fair market value of quoted shares at date of death substantially 
exceeds their re?lisable value in the estate, ic could be considered selling 
those shares in the course of the liquidation of the estate so that the
1 1938 AD 267, 9 SATC 34«
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benefit of the lower valuation under s 5(1)(a) of the Estate Duty Act can be 
obtained.
In Craddock v ZeVo Finance Co Ltd2 the issue related to the basis upon 
which investments acquired should be valued for income tax purposes. Lord 
Greene, MR held that
'published market quotations, which often relate to quite small and 
isolated transactions, are notoriously no guide to the value of 
investments of this character particularly when the amounts involved are 
large (blocks of shares).1
In Gold Coast Trust Ltd v Humphrey3 the House of Lords adopted the same 
approach as that in the Lace case and held that a large block of shares 
could not be disposed of on the stock market without killing the market and 
that the normal way to dispose of a large block would be to approach trust 
companies or financial houses to place them.
Generally speaking, the Canadian courts have ruled that no deduction can be 
made m  calculating the value of a large holding on account of blockage.
The two leading Canadian cases on this subject are Dobieco Ltd v mnr4 and 
Untermeyer Estate v Attorney-General for British Columbia.3 in the latter 
case Mr Justice Mignault said;
'I would not deduct anything from the market value of these shares on the 
assumption that the whole of them would be placed on the market at one
and the same time, for I do not think that any prudent shareholder would 
pursue a like course. To make such a deduction in a case like the one at 
bar, would be to render, the "sacrifice value" or "dumping value" of the 
shares the measure of valuation.'
Although Mr Justice Mignault did not find that a variation should be found 
because of blockage, he did uphold the findings of the Cctrmissioner 
appointed under the British Columbia Act. The Commissioner had in fact
2 (1944) 1 All ER 566
3 (1948) 1 All ER 379
4 Exchequer Court 63 OTC 1063; Supreme Court 65 DTC 5300
5 1929 SCR 84
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already reduced the listed price due to prevailing conditions. In the 
Dobieco case, however, no deduction was allowed for blockage. The court 
found that the price at which shares sell on the stock market might be 
regarded as prima facie evidence of their fair market value, although not 
necessarily conclusive if rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The court 
found that in the particular circumstances at hand insufficient evidence had 
been furnished to demonstrate that the stock market prices were not 
indicative of the fair market value of the shareholding under 
consideration.
In the United States of America both the courts and the Internal Revenue 
Service have shown a willingness to accept that the fair market value of 
large blocks and/or otherwise restricted shares may be something other than 
that indicated by the current market price of the company's shares. In US 
Revenue Ruling 59 - 60, when considering the value of a particular 
shareholding, consideration is to be given to 'sales of the stock and the 
size of the block of stock to be valued.' There have been a number of US 
cases dealing with both blockage and restricted shares.6
In some US cases the courts have applied what may be called the 'skilful 
broker' test - this fixes the value of a large block of shares at the amount 
at which a skilful broker could within a reasonable time realize the 
shares.
In the Australian case of Executors of the Estate of the Late Bruce-Sraith v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation’* the deceased held a large block of 
shares in a quoted company. The number of shares in the block was several 
times the average monthly number of shares traded on the stock exchange.
The court made an allowance for blockage following two previous Australian 
cases where such an allowance had been made, Myer v Canmissioner of TaxesS 
and Re Hamstrup.9
6 See for example Helvering v Safe Deposit and Trust Co (1938) CA 4th 95 
F 2cd 802
7 (1973) 4 ATR 148
8 (1937) VLR 106
9 (1960) VR 302
\
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In Myer's case the deceased, through a holding company, controlled a tota] 
of over one million shares in Myer Emporium Limited. Martin J reduced the 
market price of 29s to 23s 6d to aliow for the effect on the market if such 
a large parcel were released. As his Honour said:
'No-one would credit a liquidator or the executors with the folly of 
offering such large quantities of shares for sale on a given date, but it 
is obvious that anyone intending to dispose of such a number could not 
keep the news secret, that all brokers and many investors would learn of 
it, and that the market price would inevitably weaken.'
This principle, however, was not upheld by williams J in the cases submitted 
for his consideration in the High Court. In Murdoch's case1-0 when 
called upon to value 360 000 out of a total of 429 046 shares in Murdoch 
Investments Limited, i.e. sufficient to carry special resolutions by a 
three-fourths majority, he said:
’... (Counsel) asked me to find as a fact on the evidence that there was 
no-one willing to purchase a parcel large enough to give this 'ieasure of 
control, but, to ray mind, a finding on this point one way or the other is 
irrelevant.'
It was pointed out in the Bruce-Smith case, and, it is submitted correctly 
so, that an allowance wculd not be appropriate where the block of shares to 
be valued confers control over the company.
While it is clear that the size of a shareholding can hav*3 an effect upon 
value, the effect of size should not, however, be exaggerated. Whilst 
giving evidence of a general nature, stockbrokers on different occasions 
have indicated discounts of up to 20 per cent as being appropriate for large 
parcels. But it must be borne in mind that there is a point beyond which 
size would increase the value rather than reduce it, and that is when the
10 Perpetual Trustee Co v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (re Sir James 
Murdoch) (1942) 65 CLR 572
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holding approaches a controlling interest. The unit value of a parcel of 
shares sufficient to control a company might well be greater than in the 
case of a small holding.
Having regard to share placements which have been made by brokers, a 
suitable allowance for "blockage1 would range from 2,5 per cent to 10 per 
cent according to size, with nearness to control operating in the opposite 
direction*
Finally, an interesting OK case which may become important in future tax 
cases is that of Duke of Buccleuch and another v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners!!. This c'ise centred around the appropriate valuation of 
a landed estate for estate iuty. The estate took the position that there 
was little or no market for the land sold as a whole, while the taxing 
authorities argued that the oroperty could have been elaborately subdivided 
into a number of small units and sold separately. The House of Lords 
decided that neither position was realistic - i.e. that the logical approach 
was neither to look at a sale of the land as a whole nor in many small 
parcels, but rather that prudent exccutors would most likely adopt a policy 
of breaking the estate up into units for sale to developers or speculators 
who in turn would further subdivide the land into individual lots for sale 
to the public. While this case involves the valuation of land and not 
public company securities, it does recognize that there are certain problems 
in the disposition of any large asset - i.e. a large block of land or 
holding of shares - the market for which may be different than for a small 
holding of the same asset, but nonetheless a logical market does exist and 
the price which the asset would fetch in that market is the proper measure 
of its fair market value.
11 (1967) 1 All ER 129
CHAPTER 7
RELEVANT FACTORS
tn estimating the value of shares in a company it is important to ider 
all relevant factors which will have a manorial effect and would be likely 
to affect the minds of intending purchasers!.
In the Pietermaritzburg Corportion case2 the Appellate Division laid down 
the fundamental principle that ' in deciding what the prop ^ rty would be 
likely to realize, if brought to voluntary sale, the value's would be 
entitled to take into consideration every circumstance' surrounding the 
valuation, Similary, the American legislation h?-.s provided identical 
requirments. In Tri-Continental Corporation v Battye3 the Supreme Court 
stated: 1 In determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic 
value, the appraiser and the courts must take into consideration all factors 
and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value.'
The court in the Pietermaritzburg Corporation case went on to say that it 
would be impossible to enumerate all the circumstances which would have to 
be> considered by the valuer in order to ascertain the market value. These 
important dicta are basic to the valuation process. It is pertinent, 
however, to consider sane of the most important individual factors taken 
into account by the courts in valuing shares where there is no ready 
market.
History of the trade or industry
In Holt and others v Inland Revenue Commissioners,4 Danckwerts J held that 
the purchaser of share in a private company 'would consider carefully the 
prudence of the course, and would seek to get the fullest possible 
information about the past history of the company, the particular trade in 
which it was engaged and the future prospects of the canpany1
1 Estate Duty case 1 (1958) 23 SATC 362
2 1911 AD 501
3 31 Del Ch 523, 74 A 2d 71
4 (1953) 2 All ER 1499 at 1501
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General conditions of the trade or industry - econanic and political
In Attorney-General of Ceylon v Mackie^ Lord Reid stated:
'Evidence was given in the District Court as to the value of the shares. 
The leading witness for the respondents was Mr Lander, a chartered 
accountant, who had experience of rubber companies. The gist of his 
evidence was that a buyer would first ask what was the last dividend and 
when it was paid, but, as no dividend had been paid for many years, it 
was impossible to value the shares on a yield basis. He then pointed out 
that in 1940 the future was unpredictable and it was difficult to find 
anyone who was willing to invest large sums of money on speculation. He 
valued the shares on a balance sheet basis because, in his view, no one 
would have paid more than that at the time. tJien asked in 
cross-examination whether a buyer would not ha -e taken into account the 
probability that the high profits of 1940 would last for seme time, he 
said that the buyer would have needed to know precisely what was going to 
happen in the world which was devastated by a war, the length of which 
could not be guessed by the man in the street. In other words, if a 
purchaser could have guessed that there was going to be a long war, no 
government interference, no form of increased taxation, and that he was 
not going to have competition frcm others, he might take that view. He 
Would be a brave man. It would possibly be a gamble. In his view, no 
goodwill attached to the business. Similar evidence was given by other 
witnesses for the respondents,'
Similarly in the Holt case,7 Danckwerts J remarked that
'the fluctuating nature of West African trading, would be likely to have 
a greater effect upon the mind of the hypothetical purchaser than wc.r 
admit.-ed by the witnesses for the Commissioners of Inland Revenue.'
6 (1952) 2 All ER 775 at 778
7 Supra footnote 4 at 410
-•73-
Prospects of the trade or industry
In addition to the general economic and political situation, the valuer 
should consider the? particular prospects for the industry in which the 
company is operating and its relative position within that industry. If 
that industry is composed of a number of sectors for example, as in the 
engineering and chemical industries, it is that sector in which the company 
operates that needs to be considered, This was brought out in the case of 
The Trustees of Johan Thctnas Salvesen v IRC® where Lord Fleirndng included 
in the relevant facts affecting the valuation of shares of the company, the 
history of the whaling industry and the prospects of the whaling industry 
generally at the date of valuation, and of the company in particular. In 
consiuering the future prospects of the industry and of the company his 
Lordship referred to the speculative nature of the industry, the fact that 
the British Government had sent the research ship 'Discovery' to make 
scientific observations which might serve as the basis for the regulation of 
the whaling industry, but that no report was yet available. He referred to 
the government licences of shore based stations and the revocability of 
licences and prospects of further government control and restrictions. He 
thought that it was important that the directors of the company 'were so 
confident that there was no immediate prospect either of the disappearance 
of the whales or of the industry being prejudicially affected by government 
interference that they had spent large sums of money in recent years on 
purchasing whaling vessels, though their previous policy had been to hire 
them, and had also committed themselves to the extent of £300 000 for that 
season's trading. The evidence of Mr Borley, a naturalist in the employment 
of the Colonial Office, indicates that, though the natter was engaging 
attention at this time, there was no evidence to suggest that there was any 
likelihood of the disappearance or even serious diminution in the number of 
blue whales and fin whales, which constitute the major portion of the catch. 
He expressed the view that there was not likely to be any decline or 
collapse of the industry for a very considerable number of years after 1926, 
and in point of fact it appears from his evidence, and from the report of
8 (1930) 9 ATC 43
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the "Discovery" investigation, that the seasons 1926-27 and 1927-28 were 
very successful.1
Marketability of the shares
It is obviously important to consider the marketability of the shares and 
restrictions on the transfer of the Shares once a prospective purchaser is 
registered as a shareholder.
One of the assumptions to be made is that the hypothetical purchaser steps 
into the shoes of the hypothetical vendor and holds the shares subject to 
the memorandum and articles of the company and any restrictions contained 
therein. This principle was first clarified in the judgment of Chief Barron 
Palles in Attorney-General v Jaraeson^ . The hypothetical sale and purchase 
must:
’Be a sale of the property which the deceased had in the shares at the 
time of his death, that is of the entire legal and equitable interest 
therein, of that interest by virtue of which the deceased had teen, and 
had been entitled to be, "a member" of the company in respect of such 
shares; a sale by virtue of which the purchaser thereat would have been 
entitled to have had that which he had bought vested in him in the same 
manner as it had been vested in the deceased, and consequently under 
which he would be entitled to be registered as a member of the company in 
respect of those shares.'
Later he proceeded^:
'And upon this assumption, which is the supposition the statute directs 
us to make, we must exclude the consideration of such provisions in the 
articles of association as would prevent a purchaser at the sale from 
becoming a member of the company, registered as such in respect of the 
shares purchased by him at such supposed sale. If we do not, we do not
9 (1904) 2 IR 644 at 683
10 Supra footnote 9 at 689
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effect to the assumption that the statute coerces us to make.1
These passages were quoted by approval by Lord Blanesburgh in Re Crossman 
and Re Paulini1. His lordship also stated:
'And, next, if the commissioners' notional sale is to be a sale of the 
entire share just as it belonged to the deceased immediately before his 
death, then registration of the share in the name of the notional 
purchaser must also be offered.'
The special factors to be taken into account and the problems involved in 
valuing minority shreholdings and shares in private companies are dealt with 
in Chapters 5 and 9.
Prospects of the company
A purchaser of shares is usually concerned with the potential of the company 
and with the likely profits of the company after his acquisition,. Obviously 
the past results of the company are important in estimating the future 
profits.
In A-G of Ceylon v Mackie^ -2 Lord Reid sarnned it up as follows:
'Their approach was more theoretical. They assumed that it was possible 
to estimate the future average maintainable profit by means of an 
arithmetical calculation from past results and losses, and that a 
purchaser could have been found who would have paid a price for the 
shares determined by a further arithmetical calculation frcra that average 
maintainable profit. One witness said that "a buyer would concentrate on 
the last five years' profits because that is most likely to represent 
what would happen in the future"; and another witness went so far as to 
say that a prudent buyer would take it for granted that conditions would 
remain the same. It may be that these assumptions would be justified in 
many cases. Where the past history of a business shows consistent
11 (1936) 15 AIC 94 at 108
12 (1952) 2 All ER 775
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resvilts or a steady trend and where there has been no disruption of 
general business conditions it may well be possible to reach a fair 
valuation by a theoretical calculation. But in this case neither 
condition was satisfied. The profits and losses of the company had 
fluctuated so violently in the past that, as the second witness for the 
appellant admitted, it is impossible to choose any five consecutive years 
in the company's history, the result of which would be reflected in the 
next year's profits. It is therefore, in their Lordships' judgment, . ot 
possible in this case to derive by an arithmetical calculation from past 
results anything which could probably have been regarded in 1940 as an 
average maintainable profit, and in addition there were extremely 
uncertain conditions in 1940.1
Whatever the number of years selected, the valuer should ensure that any 
abnormal or extraordinary items of incane or expenditure ,‘3e scrutinized to 
see. whether they should be eliminated.
In The Trustees of Johan Thomas Salvesen v IRCl^ the profit record of 
the company was examined from the date of its incorporation on the 24 June 
1909 to the date of death on '"he 24 October 1926 in considering the trend of 
profits in the Salvesen case Lord Fleming succeeded in eliminating an 
exceptional receipt when he stated:
'I should however qualify these figures by stating that, as regards the 
year 1923-24, the company had a windfall from a PPI insurance of about 
E50 000 and I understood all the witnesses to be agreed that this 
windfall should not properly enter the profit and loss accounts at all.'
Dividend record
The dividend paying capacity and record of a company is obviously an 
important factor in the valuation of shares.
13 (1930) 9 ATC 43
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In A-G of Ceylon v Mackie^ no dividends had been paid on the management 
shares for many years and as these shares represented the entire equity 
share capital an attempt was made to value them on the basis of the 
capitalised earnings for the last five years, but in view of the highly 
volatile nature of the profits this was not supported by the court and the 
shares were valued cn the basis of the value of the tangible assets of the 
company.
In Re HoltlS, the deceased held 6,2 per cent of the ordinary issued 
share capital in the company. For 27 years prior to the shareholder's 
death, the practice of the company had been to limit dividend distributions 
on the ordinary shares to 5 per cent less tax and to build up its reserves 
by accumulating surplus profits in good years.
Danckwerts J expressed the importance of the dividend record as follows:
'Now, it is plain that the shares do not give a purchaser the opportunity 
to control the company, or to influence the policies of the directors to 
any great extent, as the shares available only represent 43,698 shares 
out of 697,680 ordinary shares which had been issued. Any purchaser, 
therefore, would be dependant upon the policy of the directors so long as 
they should have the support of the general body of the shareholders.'
A witness for the Crown, Sir Harold Barton, a chartered accountant?
'Took the extremely low yield figure of 3% and on this basis reached a 
price of 33s.4d to which he added eight pence for the dividend expected 
for the year 1947, making a price of 34 shillings.
"Apparently Sir Harold Barton was impressed by the evidence of the 
petitioners' witnesses, and in particular Mr Hole's emphasis on the 
policy of restricting the dividends, to the extent of increasing his
14 (1952) 2 All ER 775
15 (1953) 32 ATC 402
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yiel.d figure ho 4% producing a price of 25 shillings .... A great many 
of Sir Harold Barton's answers seem to me somewhat vague, and it would 
appear that he had not examined the position of the company in any great 
detail. It is not at all clear that Sir Harold Barton considered the 
effect which the restrictions on transfer of shares contained in the 
company's articles of associations would have on the purchaser.'
In arriving at a figure of 19s per share, Danckwerts J stated^:
'But I think that the witnesses for the Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
have over-valued the prospect of an increased dividend and of the issue 
of ordinary shares in the future on March 11 1948. On the other hand, 
owing to the fall in the value of money, 5% on the ordinary shares did 
represent a much smaller retur" in fact to the members of the family than 
that dividend presented in pre-war years, and there might have bean 
pressure by the family in 1948 or later to increase the dividend having 
regard to the ample earnings of the company. Moreover some possible 
hypothetical purchaser might well have thought that the company would be 
forced to raise further capital by an issue of further shares to the 
public instead of adopting the method of an issue of preference shares, 
or debentures, or ursecured notes. Any such anticipation could have been 
no more certainty than a guess. But I think that the petitioners' 
witnesses have undervalued this element in the price which the 
hypothetical purchaser might pay in this hypothetical open market.'
Another case in which dividend yield has been an important factor is that of 
Re Lynall, Lyhall v IRC^. At the date of Mrs Lynall' s death she held 
28% of the issued share capital in a company. The financial statements for 
the year ended 30 June 1962 reflected a dividend of 15 per cent, covered 
over eight times by net profit. Plowman J expressed the problem of 
valuation in the following terms:
16 supra footnote 15 at 140
17 (1971) 47 TC 375
-79-
'Iri these circumstances there are, I think, three principal factors which 
effect valuation: (1) the appropriate dividend yield; (2) the 
prospective dividend; and (3) the possibility of capital appreciation.
The evidence suggests certain general observations which may be made 
about them.
(1) Dividend yield
Two approaches to the problem of an appropriate yield have emerged during 
the course of the case. The first is to take a purely arbitrary figure 
based on experience and expertise and work from that. The other is to 
ascertain the yield which can be obtained on investments in companies in 
the same general field of industry in the public sector, and then to 
apply an arbitrary figure of discounts for the fact that one is dealing 
not with a public company but with a private company. The latter method 
has the advantage over the former that it at least starts on a factual 
basis, but it is open to criticism on a number of counts. For example, 
dividend policy in a private company is likely to be entirely different 
from dividend policy in a public company; and the regulations affecting 
the transfer of shares are likely to be entirely different in the two 
cases. Moreover, it is in the company, Llnread Ltd and its management 
and not in the industry that the hypothetical purchaser is likely to be 
interested. These are only examples and there are no doubt numerous 
other factors which influence the stock market but are irrelevant in 
considering the value of shares in a private company, and in particular 
this company. It can, however, I think, safely be said that any method 
of calculation involves the introduction of at least one arbitrary figure 
somewhere along the line.
(2) Prospective dividend
A number of factors enter into any assessment of the dividend which a 
company is likely to pay in the future. Past dividends are obviously an 
important consideration, in the case of the present company the profit
and dividend record, the dividend policy of the board and the capital 
position would have suggested that at the lowest a 15% dividend would be 
maintained. The likelihood of the increase would have to be judged in 
the light of the known policy of the directors, but that would not rule 
out the probability of an increase. A number of factors point in that 
direction, such as the upward trend of profits, the high dividend cover, 
the risk of surtax directions, the employment of surplus profits in the 
expansion of the business which itself might well lead to an increase of 
profits.
(3) The possibility of capital appreciation
It is common ground that in the present case this need only be considered 
in the context of a possible flotation. The probability of such a 
flotation was a matter depending primarily, but not entirely, on the 
wishes of the board. The board's hypothetical known assessment of the 
position at Mrs Lynall's death was that the prospect of flotation was 
"doubtful and remote." But against that attitude must be set the fact 
that it was at least a tenable view on the published information, 
including the family nature of the business and the ages of the family 
shareholders, that the board would be forced willy-nilly to go public 
sooner or later in order to provide for death duties, or for some other 
financial reason urged upon them by their advisers, such as thts fear 
(justified by the event) of the imposition of a general capital gains 
tax. Mr Lynall's subjective view of the situation must be discounted 
accordingly.1
Liquidity
The company's liquid position and financial commitments must be a relevant
factor in any valuation. In Re Holt18 Danckwerts j stated:
'At this date two of the five ships owned by the company were of an age 
which demanded their replacement. The company had a large overdraft at
18 (1953) 32 ATC 402 at 404
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its bank which approached El million in 1947. It was really caiman 
ground that the company was over trading, and that the large figures for 
profits in the years 1946 and 1947 reflected the contemporary inflation.1
Also in The Trustees of Johan Thomas Salvesen v IRC19, Lord Fleming 
stated:
'I think it may tie taken that the liquid assets of the company, that is 
to say assets that could be turned into cash at short notice, amounted to 
. over £500 000 ...
Prior to the testator's death, the company had made arrangements for 
trading in the ensuing season and had either expended or committed itself 
to an amount of about £300 000.1
Glaring
The effect, end implications to the company of gearing has to be taken into 
account. Lord Fleming in Findlay's Trustees v IRC20 summed it up as 
follows:
'It seems to me clear that the circumstances that a considerable part of 
the capital required to run the business can be raised at a comparatively 
low rate of interest on the security of the assets cannot have any effect 
in depreciating the value of the goodwill. On the contrary it would 
rather appear to me that it might have sane effect in increasing its 
value. There ±s, however, no evidence to this effect and I take it that 
the existence of the debentures is an immaterial circumstance in so far 
as the ascertainment of the value of the goodwill is concerned. But this 
does not mean that their existence is to be disregarded in fixing ths 
value of the interests of the partners. The debentures are a debt of the 
business and must be deducted from its value before the interest of the 
partners can be determined,'
19 (1930) 0 43 at 49
20 (1938) 22 ATC 137 at 439
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provisions and contingent liabilities
In valuing the shares in a company, it is necessary to take into account 
whether the company has contingent liabilities and provisions in respect of 
expenditure to be paid, e.g. taxation.
in the case of Winter (Sutherland's Trustees) v IRC21, Lord Reid dealt 
with the problem as follows:
'No doubt the words "liability" and "contingent liability'5 are more often 
used in connection with obligations arising from the contracts than with 
statutory obligations. But I cannot doubt that if a statute says that a 
person who has done semething must pay tax, that tax is a "liability" of 
that person. IC the amount of the tax has been ascertained and it is 
immediately payable, it is clearly a liability; if it is only payable on 
a certain future date it mut be a liability which has “not matured at the 
date of death" within the meaning of (FA 1940, s 50(1)). If it is not 
yet certain whether or when tax will be payable, or how much will be 
payable why should it not be a contingent liability under the same 
section?1
21 (1961) 40 ATC 361
CHAPTER 8
PUBLIC COMPANIES
For valuation purposes, one of the fundamental differences between privately 
and publicly owned business interests is t^eir relative marketability. 
Restrictions imposed by the Companies Act tend to restrict the marketability 
of shares in private companies. Few such restrictions exist for 
shareholders in public companies. Where restrictions exist, however, they 
are extremely important in considering the value of a shareholding.
For the vast majority of investors holding relatively small numbers of 
shares in public companies, the value of their investments is a direct 
function of the current stock market quotations for the company's shares.
Current market price is not necessarily indicative of fair market value 
It has long been recognized that there may not necessarily be any 
relationship between the current quoted price of a particular public 
company's shares and the fair market value of the company as a whole - i.e. 
the maximum amount which, an informed prudent investor acting at arm's length 
and under no compulsion would be willing to offer to acquire 100 per cent of 
the company's outstanding shares. The daily price quotations of stocks of 
publicly-owned companies traded on stock exchanges reflect the public's 
appraisal of relatively small lots of such stock. This price may or may not 
be indicative of the fair market value of the cotttpany as a whole.
To summarize this! point, reference is made to the comment in 1946 of the 
Council of the London Stock Exchange:
The (Stock Exchange) quotations ... definitely do not represent a 
valuation of a company by reference to its assets and its earning 
potential.
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Moreover, any valuation by reference to Stock Exchange quotations must 
introduce indefensible anomalies such as between one stock and another of 
similar standing.
... considerable fluctuations take place upwards at times and in 
circumstances when it is possible to demonstrate that no known change has 
taken place in the capital value or the earnings potential of the 
underlying assets.
In Hinchcliffe v Crabtree!, Russell LJ, in commenting on subsection (3) of 
section 44 of the UK Finance Act stated:
1... cases may occur of a control holding where mere muliplication of the 
quoted price for a single stock unit will not represent the price 
obtainable on a sale of the holding; or there may be cases where the 
Stock Exchange quotations, due to the lack of bargains, are out of date 
or stale. But there are many factors - ignorance, optimism, pessimism, 
false rumour, inside information - that contribute to a Stock Exchange 
quotation, and it would obviously be wholly disruptive of the value of 
subsection (3) if those matters were to be the subject of analysis on 
valuation. ...'
In Professor James C Bonbright's 1937 treatise, Valuation of Property, which 
has long been considered a leading authority by the valuation profession, 
several situations are suggested in which stock market prices may not be 
reflective of value:
1) Prices are influenced by a stock market boom and connot be taken as 
an index of 1 true value1;
2) There are only a few stock market transactions;
3) The size of a share block makes it saleable only at a discount from 
market price;
1 (1971) 2 All ER 104
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4} A large block is valuable for purposes of control;
5) Shares are rendered less valuable by virtue of agreements restricting 
their sale;
6) Sales were the result of a high pressure sales campaign; and
7) Reported sales have already exhausted the market.
Not only are current market prices not necessarily indicative of the fair 
market value of the company as a whole, they are not necessarily indicative 
of the value of any relatively large block of shares (as distinguished frcm 
•small holdings). The fair mmarket value of a relatively large block of 
shares is not a function of the current market price of the company's 
shares, but rather is dependent on:
* the fair market value of the company as a whole;
* the relative importance of that particular block (i.e. whether it 
represents absolute control, effective control, part of control, a 
large minority interest);
* any restrictions attaching to the particular shares; and
* the nature of the market for the sha^s
and may be considerably higher or lower than the current market price.
For estate duty purposes, stocks and shares (as defined in s 1(1) of the 
Estate Duty Act) which are quoted on any stock exchange, are valued for 
estate duty purposes like any other property. The quotation need not be on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, but can be elsewhere.
Quoted shares sold in the course of the liquidation of an estate 
S 5(1)(a) of the Act provides for the valuation of property (other than 
unquoted shares, which are valued under s 5(1)(f) bis of the Act, and 
property subject to conditions imposed by any person as a result of which 
the value of that property is reduced at or after death, which is valued
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under the proviso to s 5(1) (g) of the Act) disposed of by a sale which in 
the opinion of the Conmissioner is a bona fide sale in the course of the 
liquidation of an estate. The value of such property to be included in the 
estate is the gross price realised by the sale. Expenses incurred in 
connection with such sale, eg brokerage, are deductible as part of the 
administration and liquidation expenses under s 4(c) of the Act.
Therefore, if quoted shares are disposed of by a bona fide sale in the 
course of the liquidation of an estate, the valuation for estate duty 
purposes is the gross price realised by such sale.
Quoted shares not sold in the course of the liquidaiton of an estate
S 5(1)(g) of the Act provides for the valuation of property (other than 
limited interests, bare daninium, unquoted shares and deemed property 
specifically dealt with in s 5(1) (b) to (f) ter of the Act) not disposed of 
by a sale which in the opinion of the Commissioner is a bona fide sale m  
the course of the liquidation of an estate. The value of such property to 
be included in the estate is the fair market value thereof as at the date of 
death of the deceased as determined by a sworn appraisement by an impartial 
valuator appointed by the Commissioner. Such valuation is, however, subject 
to adjustment by the - Commissioner in terms of s 8 of the Act. Any aggrieved 
person may, under s 24 of the Act, object to and appeal against such 
valuation adjustment by the Conmissioner.
Therefore, if quoted shares ate not disposed of by a bona fide sale m  the 
course of the liquidation of an estate, the valuation for estate duty 
purposes is the fair market value as at the date of death. In practice a^  
sworn valuation will not be insisted upon. It will be sufficient to furnish 
a certificate by a stockbroker certifying the value of the quoted shares on 
the stock exchange as at the date of death. The broker normally gives the 
average or middle market price (i.e. a price approximating to the mean 
between the sellers' and buyers' quotations) which is accepted for estate
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duty purposes as representing the fair market value.
When a large parcel of shares is involved, the fair market value could be 
considerably less than the midd1 market price of the day. (See chapter 6)
Where the fair market value of quoted shares at data of death substantially 
exceeds their realisable value in the estate, it could be considered selling 
those shares in the course of the liquidation of the estate so that the 
benefit of a lower valuation under s 5(1)(a) can be obtained.
Sometimes the broker's valuation is can dividend. However, the dividend 




A private company is defined by section 20(1) of the Companies Act, 1973, 
as one which by its articles:
(a) restricts the right to transfer its shares; and
(b) limits the number of its members to fifty (excluding employees and 
ex-employees); and
(c) prohibits the invitation of public subscriptions for its shares and 
debentures.
From the point of view of valuation of the shares, the most important of 
these conditions is (a), relating to restrictions on transfer. How does 
such a provision in a company's articles of association influence the value 
of its shares, considering that according to the judgment in the 
Pietermaritzburg Corporation case^, the term 'value1 means what a 
purchaser would pay for the shares in the open market. As was 
mentioned earlier, the estate duty legislation in the United Kingdom 
specifically requires an open market to be assumed.
A further problem arising in regard to private companies, is the fact that 
more often than not, the articles of association provide that shares are 
first to be offered to the existing shareholders at a price laid down in the 
articles before they can be transferred.
Section 5(1) (f) bis of the Estate Duty Act, introduced in 1960 as a result 
of the decisions in CIR v Isaacs NO2 and CIR v Estate Adelson^, provides 
that in the case of shares in any company not quoted on any stock exchange, 
the value of such shares in the hands of the deceased at the date of his 
death as determined, subject to the provisions of section eight, by some 
impartial person appointed by the Coimissioner, subject to the following 
provisions, namely -
1 Pietermaritzburg Corporation v South African Breweries Ltd 1911 AD 501 at 
524
2 1960 (1) SA 126 (A); 23 SATC 142
3 1960 (1) SA 418 (A); 23 SATC 166
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(i) no regard shall be had to any provision in the memorandum and 
articles of association or rules of a coipany restricting the 
transferability of the shares therein, but it shall be assumed 
that such shares were freely transferable;
(ii) no regard shall be had to any provision in the memorandum and 
articles of association or rules of the company, whereby or 
whereunder the value of the shares of the deceased or any other 
member is to be determined;
(iii) if upon a winding-up of the company the deceased would have been 
entitled to share in the assets of the company to a greater extent 
pro rata to shareholding than other shareholders, no lesser value 
shall be placed on the shares held by the deceased than the amount 
to which he would have been entitled if the cer-ipany had been in 
the course of winding-up and the said amount had been determined 
as at the date of his death;
(iv) no regard shall be had to any provision or arrangement resulting 
in any variation in the rights attaching to any shares through or 
on account of the death of the deceased;
tv) there shall be taken into account any power of control exercisable 
by the deceased and the company whereunder he was entitled or 
empowered to vary or cancel any rights attaching to any class of 
shares therein, including by way of redemption of preference 
shares, if, by the exercise of such power he could have conferred 
upon himself any benefit or advantage in respect of the assets or 
profits of the company;
It follows frcrt (i) and (ii) abovp that the valuation on the statutory basis 
of shares in a private company involves in a sense a double hypothesis. The
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provisions of section 5(1)(f) bis assume that the asset to be valued is sold 
in the open market at the time of death. As respects most assets the only 
hypothesis lies in the assumption that an open market sale which was 
possible at the death did in fact then take place, in these cases it is 
frequently possible to deduce the duitiable value from the evidence of 
contemporaneous transactions in a true open market. But in valuing most 
unquoted shares it is necessary to assume a sale that not only did not 
actually take place, but was of a kind in practice quite impossible. 'An 
actual sale in open market is out of the question. A feat of imagination 
has to be performed'.4
Furthermore, regardless of the provisions of section 5(1)(f) bis, the 
problem of restricted transferability in fiscal valuations still arises in 
valuations for donations tax and income tax purposes and indeed for estate 
duty purposes where shares comprise the underlying assets of a company in 
which the deceased held a majority holding. In this last instance the 
provisions of s 5(1)(f) bis do not apply to the valuation of shares held by 
a company in which the deceased held an interest.5
The principle to be applied where, under the articles of association of the 
company, the right to transfer of shares is restricted because the directors 
have power to veto a transfer, was considered in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd6- 
The English Court of Appeal held that where directors have a discretion to 
refuse transfer, that right of discretion should be exercised bona fids in 
the interests of the company; and it is to be assumed that such right has 
been so exercised unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. The court 
went on to hold that if the directors state upon oath that they have 
exercised their discretion in a way which they consider - and not in a way 
which a court may consider - to be in the interests of the company, that 
statement must prevail unless it is shown to be wrong. It will ordinarily 
be extremely difficult for a person seeking to obtain transfer against the 
wishes of the directors to succeed where the articles are framed in this 
way.
4 Salvesen's Trustees v IRC (1930) SLT 387 at 391
5 Cl1? and another v Isaacs NO and another 1960 (1) SA 126; 23 SATC 142
6 (1942) 1 All hR 542
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The principle to be applied where, under the articles of the company, the 
right to transfer shares is restricted because they cannot be sold in the 
often market without being first offered to other members at a price which is 
either fixed in a prescribed manner, was initially considered in Ireland in 
Attorney-General v Jameson?. In the King's Bench Division, Palles CB^ 
held that
'we must exclude the consideration of such provisions in the articles of 
association as would prevent a purchaser at a sale from becoming a member 
of the company, registered as such in respect of the shares purchased by
him at such a supposed sale.'
However, the majority in the King's Bench Division took the exact converse 
view. It held that the shares must be valued on the basis that any 
purchaser in the open market will take the shares subject to the risk of 
them being claimed by existing shareholders at the price fixed by the 
articles? and that once the purchaser was on the register he would then be 
subject to a limitation in regard to his rights of alienation.
The Court of Appeal took an intermediate view, to the effect that the value 
of the shares ought to be estimated on the terms that the purchaser should
be entitled to be registered as a holder of the shares and should take and 
hold them subject to the articles of association, including the articles 
relating to alienation and transfer.
The problem next arose in the case of Salvesen's Trustees v CIR^. The 
court followed the principle established by the Court of Appeal in the 
Jameson case, with one additional condition, viz. that where the articles 
confer a right of pre-emption on other shareholders at a price which is 
below the market price, the advantage to the purchaser once he is on the 
register of having the right to purchase the shares of other members 
desiring to transfer, must be taken into account.
7 0905} 2 IR 218
8 (1904) 2 IR 689
9 (1930) SLT 387
-92-
The principle to be applied in respect of this problem was finally laid down 
by the House of Lords in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Grossman & others, 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Mann s OtherslO. In the court of 
first instance the decisions in the Jameson and Salvesen cases were 
followed. The court of appeal reversed the decision and held that the value 
was the restricted price which the executors were entitled to receive under 
the articles of association if the shares were offered for sale. The House 
of Lords by a three-to-two majority decided the case on the basis 
estateblished in the Jameson and Salvesen cases.
Crisply stated the arguments in favour of tba Crown in the Crossman & Mann 
case were as follows
(a) While the deceased lived he was in u (restricted possession of the 
shares and it is that unrestricted possession which has to be valued.
(b) Restrictions on transfer, options of purchase and rights of pre-emption 
in terms of the articles of association are not an essential part of, the 
property represented by shares but are matters of collateral contract 
affecting only title to the property.
The case for the executors relied on the definition of a share as set out in 
Borland's Trustee v Steel Bros & Company L i m i t e d ^ : share is the 
interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for the 
purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but 
also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all of the 
shareholders inter se in accordance with the Companies Act 1862. The 
contract contained in the articles of association is one of the original 
incidents of th* share.' On this definition, so the executors contended, it 
was impossible ho treat a share as being an interest in the company’s 
assets, or an aliquot share in the company's capital, and to regard the 
contract contained in the company's articles of association as a separate 
and independent thing; the contract and the right and liabilities which
10 (1936) 1 All ER 762
11 See Legal aspects of the valuation of shares by B C Berelowitz De Rebus, 
April 1979
12 (1901) 1 Ch 279
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flow from it are of the very essence of the sharq.
The views of the majority in the House of Lords in the Crossman & Mann case 
may be summarized as follows:
(a) The UK Finance Act expressly requires a sale on the open market to be 
assumed. If property cannot be sold on the open market that property will 
escape valuation and any argument on these lines must be wrong. However the 
restrictions in the articles cannot be ignored entirely and therefore it 
must be assumed that a hypothetical purchaser would procure transfer of the 
shares into his name but would hold them subject to the restrictions cn 
transfer contained in the articles.
(b) The right to receive a fixed price under the articles of association is 
only one of the elements making up the value of the share. Other elements 
include the right to dividends and the right to acquire shares from other 
shareholders who wish to transfer their shares. The value of these last two 
rights must be valued as well as the value of the right to receive the fixed 
price under the articles. All these rights are indivisible and as such 
'passed' to the deceased shareholder's executors. The entire legal and 
beneficial interest of the deceased shareholder has to be valued. It must 
be assumed that the purchaser would be able to step into the deceased 
shareholder's shoes. Accordingly the price of the shares should be 'what a 
man of means would be willing to pay for the transmigration into himself of 
the property which passed frcm (the deceased) when he died’.13
Both dissenting judges in the House of Lords were of the opinion that there 
was nothing in the UK Finance Act which justified leaving out of account the 
conditions and restrictions affecting the alienation of shares in a 
hypothetical sale in the open market.
In Re Lynall, Lynall v IRC 14 counsel for the Lynall estate invited the
House of Lords to reverse '-.heir earlier decision in Re Crossman where, on
13 The test propounded by Fitzgibbon LJ in Attorney-General v Jameson 
(1905) 2 IR 218 at 230
14 (1971) 47 TC 375
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similar facts, it was decided that the value of the sharss was to be 
estimated at the price which they would fetch if sold in the open market on 
the terms that the purchaser would be entitled to be registered and regarded 
as the holder of the shares; and that he should take and hold them subject 
to the provisions of the articles ot association, including those relating 
to alienation and transfer. The House of Lords did not reverse their 
earlier decision but, in fact, by a unanimous judgment affirmed the 
correctness of the Crossman case. Passages from two of the judgments are of 
special interests
Lord Morris
'1 have not been persuaded thot the decision in Crossman's case was 
erroneous. Section 7(5) requires an estimate to be made of the price 
which the property would fetch "if sold" in the open market. So a sale 
in the open market must be assumed and this in some cases will involve an 
assumption of the satisfaction of such conditions as would have to be 
satisfied to enable such a sale to cake place.'
Viscount Dilhorne
'There could be no sale in the open market on 2,lst May 1962 unless the 
directors agreed to the registration of the transfer of the shares and Mr 
Lynall refused to purchase the shares at El a share. Therefore, for the 
price the shares would fetch if sold in the open market to be assessed, 
it must be assumed that the directors had so agreed and Mr Lynall had 
refused to buy. ... If property is only saleable in the open market in 
certain circumstances, then when the Act requires the property to be 
valued at the price which it would fetch if solu in the open market one 
must proceed on the basis that those eircumstancec exist. This does not 
mean that the shares change their character. The shares bought by the 
hypothetical purcheser will be subject to the restrictions.’
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In deciding that the value of the shares was £3-1 Os, the law lords 
specifically stated that sufficient facts must be ’assumed’ to contemplate a 
sale in the 'open market'. If the concept of 'fair market value' implies an 
open and unrestricted market where every would-be purchaser is regarded as 
present, the valuator would have to assume whatever facts are necessary with 
respect to a particular por^'^ty to contemplate its sale in such a market.
In this regard, it is useful to compare the decision of the House of Lords 
in £e Lynall with the decision of the supreme Court of Canada in Beament v 
MNR.15
Mr Beament incorporated X Ltd in 1961 with Class A and Class B shares all 
with SI par value* The Class A shares were entitled to a 5% cumulative 
preferred dividend while the Class B shares were entitled to receive as 
dividends the remainder of the company's net earnings (excluding capital 
gains). Upon dissolution, the Class B shareholders were entitled to recover 
only the par value of their shares plus any net earnings which had not been 
distributed; and the Class A shareholders were entitled to the remainder of 
the distributable assets. Shares of both classes were voting. In summary, 
the Class A shares were like a preference share as to dividends but like a 
cannon share on dissolution; and the Class B shares were like a common share 
as to dividends but like a preference share on dissolution.
Mr Beament and his two children agreed in 1961 (i) that he would subscribe 
for 2 000 Class B shares if they would each subscribe for 12 Class A shares 
and (ii) that he would retain the 2 000 Class B shares till death and 
instruct the executors of his estate to cause X Ltd to be wound up. When Mr 
Beament died in 1966, X Ltd had net earnings of S8 725 which had not been 
distributed; and so the executors of his estate valued his 2 000 Clars B 
shares at $10 725 (including the $2 000 paid-up par value). But the company 
also had net capital gains of SI 14 239 which were either realized or 
accrued. The Minister of National Revenue used reasoning analogous to that 
found in the -jsessment which was sustained in Barter v MNR^6 to
15 (1970) SCR 680
16 (1966) DTC 315
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originally value the 2 000 Class B shares at $154 964 - the total of the 
value admitted by the executors plus the amount of the net capital gain in 
the company at death.
When the appeal came on for hearing, the Minister revised his estimate to 
$110 000 and the issue was whether the 'fair market value' of the 2 000 
Class B shares at death was $10 725 or $110 000, Considering the magnitude 
of the discrepancy between what the executors and the Minister alleged to be 
the appropriate value, it is disappointing that the Supreme Court did not 
take the opportunity to comment more fully on the concept of fair market 
value. The executors' appeal was allowed and the Chief Justice, writing for
* majority of the Court, stated:
'It is plain, as the learned President points out, that no sensible 
person would have paid more for them than $10 725,98, and that on 
winding-up the executors could not receive more than that amount. Once 
it is established (and it has been conceded) that the contract binding 
the deceased and his executors to have the Company wound up was valid, 
the real value of the shares cannot be more than the amount which their 
holder would receive in the winding-up. To suggest that they have in 
fact any other value would be altogether unrealistic. When the true 
value of the shares in the circumstances which exist is readily 
ascertainable, I can find nothing in the Act that requires the 
computation of the value they would have had under completely different 
circumstances. ...'
However, it is submitted that the Court was not required to ascertain what a 
'sensible person would have paid' or the 'real value' or 'true value'. The 
Estate Tax Act required the Court to determine 'fair market value' and there 
is ample authority to establish that fair market value contemplates a 
hypothetical market without liirlLing conditions where the prudent willing 
seller meets all the prudent would-be purchasers. Notwithstanding the
r*
differences between the provisions of the UK Finance Act the Canadian Estate 
Tax Act, no one has suggested that the hypothetical market which would 
determine value in Re Lynall is different from the hypothetical market which 
would determine value in Beament v MNR
In the above passage from Viscount Dilhorne's judgment, he said: "... for 
the price the shares would fetch if sold in the open market to be assessed, 
it must be assumed that the directors had so agreed (to register the 
transfer) and Mr Lynall had refused to buy (at par value)." it appears that 
the supreme Court of Canada declined to 'assume' the one essential fact in 
determining fair market value: i.e. that the hypothetical purchaser would 
not cause X Ltd to be wound up on Mr Beament's death.
It is difficult to understand why a contractual restriction which was 
personal to Mr Beament and did not 'attach to' the Class B shares should 
affect the determination of their fair market value when, in the Crossman 
and Lynall cases, an enforceable obligation to offer certain shares to other 
shareholders at a lew price did not deter the House of Lords in both cases 
from deciding that the 'market value' of the shares was a higher amount.
The dramatic difference in the results of the cases arises from the facts 
which the House of Lords was prepared to assume and the facts which the 
Supreme Court of Canada declined to assume.
In terms of South African legislation there is no statutory provision 
compelling a sale in the open market to be assumed; except for cases falling 
under section 5(1)(f) bis of the Estate Duty Act. However, a sale in the 
open market is normally assumed to be the basis for arriving at a valuation. 
If the shares to be valued are h*>ld to be freely transferable where the 
articles provide otherwise, then once the hypothetical purchase is on the 
register as a member his shares must be valued at that point. And if that 
is done it must again be assumed that there are no restrictions on transfer 
and this leads inexorably to the conclusion that ic must always be assumed
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in the case of shares in a private company that there is no restriction on 
the transfer of shares at all. But this line of reasoning was expressly 
rejected by Viscount Hailsham DC, one of the majority judges in the Crossman 
& Mann case, in the following terms: 'To value the shares on the basis that 
the restrictions contained in the articles were to be ignored would be to 
value a property which the deceased never owned and which did not pass on 
his death.'
Finally, it remains to discuss the possible approach which would be adopted 
by a South African court in fixing the price of shares where the articles 
confer a pre-emptive right for the shares to be acquired at a fixed price.
In CIR v Estate Whiteawayl7 and Estate Robottom v C±r1® the courts 
had to consider the implications of agreements ei:c-^ red into by deceased 
persons- whereunder shares or partnership •> r> :s ware to be sold after 
death at pre-deterroined values. In boti , the court held that were a 
partnership agreement provided that on the ueath of a partner the surviving 
partner should purchase the deceased partner's interest in the firm at the 
valuation prescribed by the deed, it was not correct to value the deceased's 
share in the partnership by reference to the amount of the purchase price 
fixed by the partnership agreement.
The same principle was applied in CIR v estate Kirsch & Others1-9 where 
the property in question was shares in a private company. The deceased, 
during his lifetime, had entered into an agreement in terms of which two 
other people had to purchase and the deceased's executors were obliged to 
sell the shares held by the deceased at a fixed price. The court ignored 
that price for the purposes of valuing the shares.
It is interesting to note that the south African courts in the Whiteawav and 
Robottom cases came to the same conclusion as the Australian court in 
Findlay's Trustees v C I R 2 0 ; and the court in Findlay's case followed the
17 1933 TPD 486? 6 SATC 188
18 1961 (1) SA 33 (c); 24 SATC 56
19 1951 (3) SA 496 (Ah 17 SATC 412
20 (1938) 22 ATC 437
priciple established in the Jameson, Salvesen and Crossman cases.
CHAPTER 10
VALUATION PROCESS NOT AN EXACT SCIENCE
It could be argued that the valuation of shares of a company is an art 
rather than an exact science. Eminent authorities on valuation have 
disagreed on prices to be paid for shares as often evidenced by the number 
of increases from initial bid price in the acquisition of a number of publics 
companies. The valuator must follow the basic rules of financial analysis 
and operations appraisal. Even after all his study, his vauation is only an 
opinion, albeit an informed opinion, resting upon a delicate equilibrium of 
fact and judgment.
In Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd v Humphrey Inspector of Taxes! the court 
recognised that
'valuation is an art, not an exact science. Mathematical certainty is 
not demanded, nor, indeed, is it possible. It is for the commissioners 
to express in the money value attributed by them to the asset their 
estimate, and this is a conclusion of fact to be drawn from the evidence
before them.1
In the Pietermaritzburg Corporation case2 the court also recognised that 
only approximate results can be obtained through a process of valuation. 
Innes J held that
'it may not be always possible to fix the market value by reference to 
concrete examples. There may be cases where, wing to the nature of the 
property, or to the absence of transactions suitable for comparison, the 
valuator's difficulties are much increased. His duty then would be to 
take into consideration every circumstance likely to influence the mind 
of a purchaser, the present cost of erecting the property, the uses to 
which it is capable of being put, its business facilities as affording an 
opportunity for profit, its situation and surroundings, and so on. There 
being no concrete illustration ready to hand of the operation of all 
these considerations upon the mind of an actual buyer, he would have to
1 (1948) 2 All ER 1499
2 1911 AD 501
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employ his skill and experience in deciding what a purchaser, if one were 
to appear, would be likely to give. And in that way he would to the best 
of his ability be fixing the exchange value of the property.1
The irrational behaviour of market prices v/as also recognized in Salvesen's 
Trustees v CIR3 where the court held that 'the estimation of the value of 
shares by a highly artificial standard which is never applied in the 
oirdinary share market must be a matter of opinion and does not tdmit of 
scientific or mathematical calculation'.
In Re Hayes Will Trusts, Pattinson & another v Hayes & a n o t h e r 4  the court 
held as follows:
'It is in this context that the words “best possible price that is 
obtainable" appear. They are directed to the sale being in such manner 
as would obtain the best possible price in the market. It does not mean 
that the price to be fixed by valuation is the highest possible price 
that might be obtained. It has been established time and again in these 
courts, as it was in this case, that there is a range of prices, in sane 
circumstances wide, which competent valuers would recognise as the price 
which "property would fetch if sold in the open market". Neither the 
section, nor Sankey J requires that the top price of that range should be 
the price fixed for estate duty. That price together with the lowest 
price in the range may be expected to be the least likely price, in the 
absence of consultation between the valuers representing conflicting 
interests, would presumably be the mean price.'
It is interesting to compare this with Earl of Ellesmere v ClR5 where 'the 
price in the open market' was interpreted as 'the best possible price that 
is obtainable'.
In Estate Duty Case No lfi James J, in fixing the value of shares, approved 
of the dictum that ' the application of (valuation) principles is not a
3 (1930) SLT 307
4 (1971) 2 All ER 341
5 (1918) 2 KB 735
6 23 SATC 362
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matter of pure mathematics, and there is roan for wide differences of 
opinion as to relative weight to be given to each of the several factors in 
the circumstances of any particular case1.
CHAPTER 11
THE DIVIDEND BASIS OF VALUATION
In theory, the value of a share, like that of any other financial asset, is 
the present value of the future cash flows associated with ownership. For 
an individual shareholder, the cash flow consists of dividends received plus 
the proceeds of eventual sale of the shares. But, for all present and 
future investors in total, expected cash flows consist only of future 
dividends, barring of course a sale or liquidation of the company, in other 
words, the eventual proceeds of sale vail themselves be the capitalised 
value of future dividends expected to be received from then onwards. On 
this view, the value of the share is calculated at the present value of an 
infinite stream of dividends.
Basic approach
If dividends were expected to be constant, they would be valued as a 
perpetuity._ Thus, a share paying a dividend of 20 cents gross would be 
valued at 133 cents, assuming an appropriate rate of return of 15 per cent. 
This can be stated in general terms as follows;
V = D 
r
where v - the value of the share
D = the dividend per share 
and r = the required rate of return.
Where a share has no growth prospects, the rate or return is simply the 
expected dividend yield.
Dividends, of course, are rarely constant and the problem in dividend based 
valuations is to know what dividends are going to be declared in the future, 
as well as the appropriate rate at which they should be discounted. If the 
dividend policy is unlikely to change, i.e. if the payout ratio remains the 
same, dividends should grow in line with earnings. More often than not, 
however, the payout ratio varies from year to year. This is because firms
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like to maintain a steady growth in dividends, whereas profit growth tends 
to be uneven. This fortuitous circumstances makes it easier for the valuer 
to project a dividend growth rate into the future. If, for example, 
dividends have grown at the rate of 5 per cent a year compound over the 
previous five years and the historical pattern of profits growth is unlikely 
to change in the future, the valuer might well conclude that dividends are 
likely to grow by 5 per cent a year in the future.
Where it is posible to mak'j! a statement like this about dividends, the
1 normal' or constant growth dividend valuation equation, set out below, can 
be used:
V = D 
r - g
where V = the value of the share
D = the prospective gross dividend per share 
r = the required rate of return 
and g - the expected growth rate.
Thus a share with a prospective dividend of 20 cents gross, expected to grow 
at 5 per cent a year compound, would be valued at 200 cents on the basis of 
a required rate of return of 15 per cent, as calculated below:
V * 20 = _20_ - 200 cents
0,15 - 0,05 0,10
The prospective dividend yield in the above example is 10 per cent (i.e. 20 
cents dividend by 200 cents). This must not be confused with the expected 
rate of return which is 1.5 per cent.
The required rate of return
What rate o£ return should the investor require for a particular investment? 
In theory, he will require the same rate of return as he can obtain on 
alternative investments of similar riskiness. In practice, when unlisted 
shares are being valued, this usually entails a search for comparable listed
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shares are being valued, this usually entails a search for canparabl listed 
companies.
Comparison with quoted shares
However, it is unlikely that a quoted company would serve as a direct 
comparison with the shares being valued but allowance for difference in size 
and diversity of business can always be made in arriving at the price, some 
of the problems of such a comparison have been referred to by plowman J in 
his -comments in Re Lynall, Lynall v IRC*. In the Court of Appeal in re 
Lynall*, Cross LJ Stated:
'Another point which was argued in favour of the public information test 
was that the price of shares quoted on the Stock Exchange depends on the 
market's assessment of pub]ished as opposed to confidential information, 
and that it was desirable that the same standards should be applied to 
the valuation of every sort of share. I connot follow this argument at 
all, for the market of the sale of quoted shares is completely different 
from the market for the sale of holdings in private companies. No one 
will be a "willing" purchaser of shares quoted on the Stock Exchange at a 
price higher than the quoted price, and if he happens to have 
confidential information showing that the shares are worth less than the 
quoted price he will not be willing to buy at all.'
in considering any comparison with quoted public conrpanies it is worth 
bearing in mind the contents of Sachs LJ in Hinchcliffe v Crabtree2:
'The fact remains that day in and day out there occur on the London stock. 
Exchange situations in which it may well be said chat an announcement 
should have been made by some company which if made would affect the 
price of the quoted shares. This can and does happen in relation to many 
and various events. For instance, it happens in relation to news of the 
success or failure of boreholes affecting the prospects of mining
1 (1971) 47 TC 375
2 (1971) 47 TC 419 at 437
-106-
companies; to the publication of a company ' s accounts being deferred 
beyond the proper time; to the effects of important matters which may 
only later become public when published accounts appear; or to the 
inminence of the successful completion of some negotiations resulting in 
a highly valuable contract. Sometimes the absence of that information 
may result in the quoted prices on the Stock Exchange being higher than 
had it been available, and sometimes lower. That all forms part of the 
pattern of the general circumstances in which the market operates and 
under which prices are rixed having regard to supply and demand. The 
Stock Exchange, like other bodies concerned with the good name and best 
interest in the city, may be taken to do its best to see that as much 
information as practicable is available to those who deal in the market. 
It does not, and cannot, guarantee the availability of that information, 
and having regard to the general circumstances in which it operates, it a 
cannot be said to be a special circumstance merely that in sane 
particular instance information has not become available.'
But, the valuer need not be deterred by the fact that no two companies are 
identical or equivalent, it is generally possible to reflect differences 
between companies in the required rate of return. This, in fact, is what 
modern financial theory tells us the stock market does: prices of assets in 
capital markets adjust until equivalent risk assets have identical expected 
returns.
Having selected listed ccrnpanies of a closely similar size and activity as 
possible to the subject company, the valuer muse exercise his professional 
skill and judgement in selecting a rate of return which takes into account 
the differing investment merits (in esser.ee, the differing risk) of each 
company in the comparison. To do this he first needs to know the rate of 
return implied by the share prices of the listed companies.
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The abovementioned principles were confirmed by Maguire J in McNamee 
IRC3
'Mr Cave, Mr Scanlon and Mr Abrahamson have gone to great trouble to 
prepare comparative tables of other companies carrying on similar 
busi.ness having stock exchange quotations for their shares. Those have 
been examined and explained. I am satisfied without going into details, 
but having considered all the evidence that the analogies which they have 
drawn frcm other companies are far from complete, and that they are 
misleading. I am satisfied too that the inferences they ask me to draw 
cannot fairly be drawn in the tc-se of these shares in the Convoy Woollen 
Company. The affairs of each company must be considered in relation to 
its own position, its ~>wn difficulties, and its own domestic control.*
To calculate the rate of return for the selected listed companies, we have 
to solve for 'r' in the dividend valuation equation given above. This can 
be restated as:
r * D + g 
V
In words, the rate of return is equal to the prospective dividend yield plus 
the growth rate. As the share price (V) is known, and the prospective 
dividend (D) should not be too difficult to forecast, we need to know only 
the value of g, the future growth rate in dividends, in order to calculate 
the rate of return.
If the listed company's share price is 200 cents, its prospective dividend 
2Q cents per share gross, and if dividends are expected to grow by 5 per 
cent a year, the implied rate of return is 15 per cent, as Calculated below:
r = D + g = J20 + 0,05
V 200
= 0,10 + 0,05 = 0,15
3 (1954) IR 214
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The expected rate of growth in dividends is not publicly available in 
formation, but, in an efficient, well informed market, investors' views as 
to the likely dividend growth rate should be within certain bounds. The 
valuer must put himself in the shoes of the investor and form an opinion as 
to the dividend growth rate that might reasonably be inferred from the 
evidence available. To do this, the valuer should be as knowledgeable about 
the selected listed companies as he is about the subjcct company, (in 
practice, this is not always possible because of lack of information.) It 
is important to remember that in this process the valuer forms an opinion as 
to the expected growth rate, and hence as to the required rate of return.
It is his expert opinion, but there is nothing absolute about it.
With an appropriate rate of return for the subject coraapny derived from the 
selected listed companies, the value of the subject company's shares, as 
listed, can be calculated using the dividend valuation equation. (However, 
the model must not be used where the dividend growth rate exceeds the 
required rate of return. If the equation is used in this situation, the 
results are meaningless.) The value of the shares, as listed, should then 
be discounted for the lack of marketability to arrive at the final 
valuation.
Comparison with other investments
If analogies are not drawn frctn companies listed on the Stock Exchange, the 
required rate of return has to be found from other sources. The prospective 
investor in shares in an unquoted company, being a careful and prudent 
investor, would also be influenced by the potential yields and likelihood, 
or otherwise, of capita] appreciation in ther forms of investment than 
equity shares whether quoted or unquoted.
These could include gilt-edged securities, savings certificates, building 
society and bank deposits, quoted debentures and preference shares. The 
investor is likely to be interested in the net amount after tax on such
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investments in comparison with that available on the unquoted shares and 
such return is therefore going to have some effect on the price which he 
would be prepared to pay for unquoted shares.
However, these are different forms of investment, and the analogy is 
accordingly weaker. In theory, the rate of return on equity investments 
should be higher than that required on risk-free securities such as gilts.
The valuer who believes strongly that comparisons with the stock market are 
invalid must arrive at the appropriate risk premium on a judgemental basis. 
He may feel that a premium of x per cent is justified, and he may be right. 
But, if he cannot point to independent evidence supporting his conclusion, 
the authority of his valuation will be weakened. This is a serious drawback 
if the valuation report is to form the basis of negotiation, whether fiscal 
or otherwise, or if it is to be used in Court.
Initial Yield Method
This method has a wide following in practice. It consists of applying the 
appropriate initial yield to the current dividend. If the appropriate 
initial yield is ascertained, a correct valuation will result. This can be 
illustrated using the example given above of the share with a prospective 
dividend of 20 cents gross, expected to grow at 5 per cent a year. If the 
valuer concluded that the appropriate initial dividend yield was 10 per 
cent, he would value the share at 200 cents - exactly the same figure as 
arrived at by using the required rate of return.
The initial yield method has significant disadvantages. As is clear from 
the dividund valuation method, the initial yield is merely an amalgam of the 
required rate of return (r) and the txpe~ted growth rate (g). By not 
considering tnese two vital constituents of the valuation in a formal 
manner, the element of intelligent guesswork or inspired hunch - alas, 
present to some degree in most valuations - is greatly increased.
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Furthermore, the rate of return implied by the valuation may be inadequate 
for the valuer's client but this will not be apparent using the initial 
yield method. Lastly, there could be a tendency in inexpert hands for the 
yield to be confused with the rate of return.
CHAPTER 12
THE EARNINGS BASIS OF VALUATION
Earnings are the bedrock of business values. They are the fund form which 
dividends are paid and they are ultimately the basis of all asset values.
A sigisiftnt decision was given in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
October 1931, in what is known as the Fairfax case, 1 where it was 
necessary to determine the value of shares in John Fairfax & Sons Ltd, for 
the purpose of assessing stamp duty payable by the trustees of a deceased 
estate. In the course of his judgment, Halse Rogers J said:
'In my view the most satisfactory basis on which to make the necessary 
investigation as to value is to consider first the figures showing the 
earning power of the company at the relevant date.'
He proceeded to hake the average annual profits for the preceding four years 
and capitalized them on the basis of an eight per cent return being 
applicable to that type of business. He then reduced the price so 
ascertained by twenty-feu1" per cent, because between the last day of th*. 
financial year (30 June 1923) and the date of the deceased's death (27 April 
1930) stock exchange quotations for practically all first-class stocks 
showed an average fall of that rate.
In the .American case oE Cottrell v Pawcatuck Company2 ^  was held in the 
Supreme Court by Southerland CJ that a sale of the undertaking of a company, 
challenged by a minority shareholder, was not at a grossly inadequate price.
Although the debtors were sold at their face value, patents which had a 
bookvalue of S52 828 were sold for Si and stock, plant and equipment with a 
book value S5 395 000 was sold for approximately S2 223 000. Southerland 
stated at 229:
1 Fairfax v commissioner of Stamp DJties (1931) 48 WN (NSW) 255
2 128 A 2d 225 (1957)
-112-
' it has been repeatedly held in this State that upon a sale of corporate 
assets of an industrial corporation the book value is of far less 
importance than earning power and that reproduction cost less 
depreciation and valuation for insurance purposes are of little help in 
determining market value of plant and equiptment. See Baron v pressed 
Metals of America Del 123 A 2d 848/ and cases cited. These principles 
are applicable here. There was produced in this case, as in the Pressed 
Metals case, an insurance valuation. It totalled $13 000 000 on physical 
properties. The plaintiff also produced an engineer's appraisal of plant 
and equipment of S6 094 000 on the basis of reproduction cost new, less 
depreciation. A consideration of the evidence touching going concern 
value based on earnings will disclose that little weight can be attached 
to these appraisals in determining whether the price received was grossly 
inadequate.'
Later on he stated:
'When we turn to the testimony of the experts upon the issue of value we 
find that they all are apparently in agreement that sane fonna of 
capitalised earnings is the most appropriate methyl of evaluating the 
worth of the old company. But they are in marked disagreement both in 
computing net earnings and in selecting the basis of capitalisation.
The important point arising from this case is confirmation that the vslue of 
a business sold as a going concern is to a large extent dependent on the 
capitalised value of its earnings.
The importance of earnings is recognised in the widespread use of the 
price/earnings ratio as an investment criterion for listed shares. This 
ratio is simply the price of a share dividend by its earnings. It is the 




Earnings = 12f 
Price 100
100 cents 
121 cents * 
12H
P/E ratio
Price _ = 100 =
Earnings 12|
8
* Earnings per share are defined as the profit attributable to each equity 
share- based on the consolidated profit of the period after tax and after 
deducting minority interests and preference dividends, but before taking 
into account extraordinary items,
Nothing could be more straightforward, it seems, than an earnings based 
valuation: one simply choses the appropriate P/E ratio from suitable 
comparable companion and apply it to the relevant earnings per share and a 
correct valuation should result. In practice, however, the path to this 
sort of valuation is strewn with pitfalls. The difficulties are twofold and 
fundamental. Firstly, published earnings per share figures are no longer 
comparable as between companies and, secondly, the P/E ratio itself has come 
under attack both from market practitioners and from theoreticians and it is 
no longer universally accepted as the infallible indicator of the market's 
opinion of a share.
The P/E Ratio
The demise of the P/E ratio has been brought about to some extent by the 
lack of generally agreed earnings per share figures for individual companies 
and also by investors' growing realisation that in times of high inflation 
earnings calculated under the historical cost convention may be totally 
misleading. However, the concept of the P/E ratio itself - its usefulness 
as an investment yaristiek - has been questioned, and there is little doubt 
that the P/E ratio has lost its pre-eminent position. In fact, it is being 
increasingly recognised that p -'e ratios are r.'t the determinants of stock
prices but are merely derivatives of them.
Modern Portfolio Theory, with its risk measurement techniques and the 
concept of beta, has not had the same impact on the investment community in 
this country as it has had overseas, Nevertheless, the new techniques are 
practised to seme extent here and, of course, the theories themselves have 
been widely disseminated. The valuer of unlisted shares, although not as 
intimately concerned with these new theories as is the stock market 
professional, should nevertheless be familiar with them. He will probably 
want to keco an open mind on the new techniques which, like the P/E ratio, 
may turn out to be just another investment fashion.
Lastly, in cataloguing the woes of the P/E ratio, mention should be made of 
the high rates of interest prevailing and the effect on earnings of the 
economic recession. With earnings growth the exception rather than the rule 
and cash flow an important consideration, the dividend basis of valuation 
has regained some of its former popularity, largely at the expense of the 
P/E ratio.
Controlling Interests
The purchase of a controlling interest in a company usually entails a major 
outlay of funds, it is essential from both the buyer's and the seller's 
viewpoint that the investment is evaluated logically and unambiguously.
Frcm the previous remarks about earnings per share and the P/E ratio it will 
be apparent that neither of these tools is satisfactory.
As company tax is virtually an optio^l impost for most companies, the view 
is often expressed that pretax profits are ths most suitable basis for 
valuing controlling interest. One of the significant advantages of this 
basis is that the resultant pretax profits yield, as adjusted for the growth 
rate, is directly comparable with the internal rate of return which the 
corporate purchaser/vendor has set for its own capital investment programme.
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It is also directly comparable with yields available in the capital markets 
(e.g. gilt redemption yields, money market rates, and so on).
Great care must be taken in assessing the company's profit potential. The 
profits to be capitalised will generally be those immediately in prospect 
unless for special reasons these are unrepresentative of the underlying 
potential.
The rate of capitalisation
How does one select the capitalisation rate? There are basically two 
approaches:
(a) the comparable company method; and
(b) the investment approach
If the valuer uses method (a) he derives his capitalisation rate from an 
examination of the terms of recent takeover bids in the stock market. Put 
simply, if company X was successfully bid for on a prospective pre-tax 
profits yield of 20 per cent, other things being equal the subject company 
would be capitalised at the same rate. If method (b) is used, the 
capitalisation rate is objectively determined by reference to the rates of 
return on various alternative forms of investment, as adjusted for the 
perceived degree of risk. Alternatively the purchaser's/vendor's own 
required rate of return may be used.
The comparable company method has many adherents but, in the authc 's view, 
the investment approach to selecting a capitalisation rate is super.or. 
Unless one was actually privy to the confidential negotiations for a 
takeover, one can never be sure merely from examining the public entrails of 
the bid to have correctly identified the profits which the purchaser and 
vendor had in mind when they agreed the bid price. It could be misleading 
merely to take the published profit figure. Furthermore, the comparable 
company approach seems to bo based on the somewhat artificial concept of an
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open market value for an entire company. But controlling interests in 
companies do not change hands with the frequency and facility of normal 
stock market trading. Potential buyers are few and far between and the 
subject company may have many different values to each potential buyer. The 
price struck in a particular bargain is a function of two sets of values: 
those of the purchaser and those ot the vendor. In routine portfolio 
investment on the stock market the value gap between purchaser and vendor is 
so small that one can generally take the latest recorded price as an 
indication of market value and be sure of buying or selling at or near that 
price. This is not so with controlling interests. The comparable company 
approach does not identify the value gap and therefore ignores a potent 
influence on price. It could lead to negotiations being broken off because 
the price being asked is too high or it could induce a vendor to accept a 
needlessly low price.
Under the investment approach, the capitalisation rate is selected by 
reference to rates of return available in the marketplace, the degree of 
risk attaching to the company's operations, and the client's own required 
rate of return. Using this approach, one should be able to assess the value 
of the company to the client, this sets the highest price he should be 
prepared to pay, if a buyer, or the minimum he should accept, if a seller. 
The likely price for the company will depend on the value placed on the 
business by the other party, be he purchaser or vendor. For this reason, it 
is generally essential in the valuation of controlling interest to envisage 
a specific purchaser ir class of purchaser. This is not as difficult as it 
sounds, Obvious potential purchasers can usually be found in the ranks of 
competitors or those in closely allied industries. More often than not, 
however, the client will already have a third party in mind.
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that sometimes the client has no third 
party in mind and no obvious purchaser is around. The client wants to know 
what his company is worth and the valuer has to value in a vacuum. He then
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has to select the capitalisation rate purely from his own experience and 
judgement. Clearly, however, it cannot be less than the risk-free rate of 
return available on gilts. Profitable, established, well managed, 
medium-sized companies are generally capitalised on pre-tax profits yields 
of 20-25 per cent. Small, well managed companies would sell on higher 
yields, generally 30-35 per cent. These are general indications. They 
would be lower for companies with superior management, high profits growth 
and strong asset backing; they could well be much higher if management is 
bad, the industry background depressed and the asset backing poor. These 
yields will not be valid for all time. The investment scene is constantly 
changing.
It is appropriate at this stage to digress slightly and recall the 
distinction between the yield and the rate of return on an investment. The 
yield expresses the immediate profits (or dividend', as a percentage of the 
price. The rate of return is that discount rate which will equate the 
present values of the future returns to the current price/value of the 
investment. The future annual profits of a business ad infinitum are 
unknown and the simplifying assumption of a normal annual rate of growth in
profits usually has to be made. Assuming such a normal or constant growth 
rate, the race oE return is found by adding the expected growth rate in 
profits (or dividend, as appropriate) to the yield. If no growth is 
expected the yield and the rate of return are identical.
The mathematical formula which expresses the value of a business in terms of 
its future earnings on the simplifying assumption of a normal growth rate is 
as follows:
V = E 
r - g
Where V - the value o£ tht company
E = earnings (i.e. pre-tax profits)
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r = required rate of return 
g = expected growth rate in profits.
This is the sane formula as used for dividend based valuations but with 
appropriate change of symbols.
This formula can be restated to show that the required rate of return (r) is 
equal to the yield plus the growth rate (g) namely: 
r = JS + g
V
The proof of the first equation, and how the second equation is derived from 
the first, is given in most financial or investment textbooks
No one invests merely for the next year's profit or dividend but for a 
stream of future returns. Thus the initial yield (whether it be profits or 
dividends) is meaningless on its own; its adequacy or appropriateness can 
only be considered in the light of the expected growth rate. The average 
'rule of thumb' yields suggested in the third preceding paragraph are all 
based on the assumption that the companies concerned will have average 
growth prospects. With inflation currently running at around 16 per cent, 
companies muat gtc*,*i by at least this rate in order to maintain their 
position. Thus, at least 7 percentage points ha1'.* to be added to all the 
yields in ordar to obtain the implied rates of -turn, on this basis, the 
lowest; r.j:;e of return wouid be 36 per cent fi.^ . initial yield of 20 per 
cent plus the 16 per cent growth rate' e?:i th highest (for the well managed 
.S':™ ia 11 company* 51 per ee it (i.e. 35 par cent plus 16 per cent'. These 
rate's of return are over h* ice or even throe t lines the rate of return on 
gilts and give some crude measure of the hea*y price exerted by investors 
"* r assuming equity risk i>i the present ecorr«>iic elirete.
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Minority Interests
The minority shareholder has no say in the management of his company and he 
cannot realise its assets. The return on his shares comes solely in the 
Eorm of dividends. Any profit Dn sale will be based on dividend paying 
potential since the eventual buyer, too, will realise that all he can expect
to get out of the company is dividends. In the author’s view therefore, it 
is an error to value minority shareholdings in unlisted companies on an 
earnings basis i.e. as though the relevant proportion of the earnings of the 
company will be credited to the minority shareholder and be available for 
withdrawal at his behest. In the valuation of minority shareholdings 
earnings are relevant not as the return on the investment but as an 
indicator of the dividend paying potential. Not everyone would accept this 
arguing that the attention given to earnings in stockbrokers' circulars and 
the financial press is proof that listed companies are valued on their 
earnings, and therefore minority hodligns in unlisted companies may also be 
valued on their earnings. However, this is a superficial view which does 
not stand up to close inspection.
An earnings based valuation will generally be higher than a dividend based 
one since earnings normally exceed dividends by a comfortable margin. 
Consider, for example, a company with the following investment 
characteristics:
Earnings per share as reported 45 cents
Dividend per share 15 cents
Likely annual growth rate in dividends
and earnings 12|%
Required rate of return 20%
Required yield (20 per cent less 12! per cent) S|%
If the yield of 3,5 per cent is applied to the gross dividend, a value of 
176 cents emerges; if it is applied to the earnings a val'ie of 529 cents 
results. This substantial difference highlights the importance of using the
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correct basis.
Paradoxically, when one uses the P/E ratio to value minority holdings, the 
difference between the eamings-based value and the dividend-based one is 
not so marked. In fact, if the dividend cover of the company being valued 
and the comparable company are identical, there may even be no difference in 
the values produced by the two different bases. This can best be 
illustrated by an example of a fictitious listed company with the following 
investment characteristics:
Share price 176 cents
Earnings per share (fully taxed) 45 cents
Dividend per share 15 cents
Net assets per share 209 cents
Therefore:
Dividend yield (gross) 15 8,5%
If we were valuing an unlisted ccsnpany by comparison with this listed
company and both company1s dividends were three times covered, there would 
be no difference between the dividend yield valuation and the valuation 
using the above P/E ratio. But this is pure coincidence, and does not mean 
that the P/E ratio can be relied on to give the right a.iswer. For instance, 
if we additionally assume that the subject company also has the sane rate of 
return on assets as the listed company, we could simply apply the discount 
of 16 per cent to its net assets and the same valuation would be produced. 
This is illustrated below:
176
P/E ratio
Discount to net assets 
Dividend cover 







Earnings per share 
Dividend per share 










Dividend yield 21,5 cents 252 cents
8,5%
P/E ratio 64,5 cents x 3,9 252 cents
'fet assets: 300 cents less discount of 16: 252 cents
This convergence of the three valuations is a coincidence but it underlines 
nevertheless the fact that dividends, earnings and assets are all facets oE 
the one reality. The are closely related to one another but this 
relationship is highly unstable and one is pror.e to fall into serious error 
in valuing minority holdings on an earnings basis just as one is by valuing 
such holdings on an asset basis. At best one will obtain a correct 
valuation using invalid methods.
In practice, of course, companies do not have the same dividend cover. More 
often than not, the private company will have a much higher cover than the 
listed analogue and in these cases the use of the p/E ratio will produce 
substantially higher valuations.
CHAPTER 13
THE ASSETS BASIS OF VALUATION
The notion that the shares oE a company, other than one whose assets are 
easily realised, are worth the sum of its individual asset values, less its 
liabilities, has no basis in theory or fact. The value of a company's 
share, from the shareholders' point of view, derives from that company's 
ability to earn profits and pay dividends. The ability to earn profits 
arises frcm the combination and co-operation of labour (i.e. management and 
workforce) and capital (i.e. the assets); it is fallacious therefore to look 
at the assets cn their own.
There are exceptions to this rule. The shares of a company whose assets 
have a realisable value independent of the business are generally valued on 
an assets basis alone. For example, the shares of a property company or an 
investment trust company might well be valued solely on an assets basis.
The classic case for an asset basis of valuation is provided by the company 
either in the course of, or expecting to be, wound up.
The assets basis is not appropriate for valuing minority shareholdings 
unless the company is expected to go into liquidation, nevertheless, the 
net asset backing per share may have an influence on such valuations. A 
company with substantial asset backing will usually be a safer investment 
than one with slender asset backing, evan though both companies may have 
similar earnings and dividend prospects. The company with the substantial 
asset backing will therefore merit a higher multiple.
One of the first legal dec .sions in Australia to indicate that assets value 
must not be ignored entirely was that of Piper J in the Supreme Court of 
South Australia, in his judgment in Elder's Trustee Co v Commissioner of 
Succession Duties!;
'I think buyers and sellers in an open market would be more directly
1 (1932) SASR in at 15
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influenced by the apparent earning power than by complex calculations on 
net assets, but those assets would be regarded generally for assurance 
that returns would be maintained....'
The following quotations from two judgments of Williams J under the Estate 
Duty Assessment Act in the High Court of Australia, express the same 
principle that while assessment of the value must be based mainly upon the 
income yield, regard must be given to the asset backing of the shares -
Abrahams' case:2
'The final assessment of the value of the shares must be made principally 
on the basis of the incane yield ... but where, owing to exceptional 
circumstances the valuation of this basis presents "enormous 
difficulties" it is legitimate ... to rely more than usual on the assets 
value.'
Murdoch's case-.3
'The main items to be taken into account in valuing shares are the 
earning powers of the company and the safety of the capital assets in 
which the shareholders' money is invested.'
The valuer should not lose sight, however, that the basis of valuation must 
depend on the circumstances. This point was considered where valuable 
farmland had been transfered to a fanning company in M'Connel's Trustees v 
IRC4. It was stated by Lord Fleming:
'The petitioners found upon the fact that for each of the three years 
after its formation the eornpany made a loss and they say there was never 
any prospect of the company earning profits or being in a position to pay
2 (1944) 70 CLR 23 at 42
3 (1942) 65 CLR 573 at 580
4 (1927) SLT 1.4 at 15
-123-
influenced by the apparent earning power than by complex calculations on 
net assets, but those assets would be regarded generally for assurance 
that returns would be maintained....’
The following quotations frcra two judgments of Williams j under the Estate 
Duty Assessment Act in the High Court of Australia, express the same 
principle that while assessment of the value must be based mainly upon the 
income yield, regard must be given to the asset backing of the shares -
Abrahams1 case:2
'The final assessment of the value of the shares taust be made principally 
on the basis of the income yield ... but where, owing to exceptional 
circumstances the valuation of this basis presents "enormous 
difficulties" it is legitimate ... to rely more than usual on the assets 
value.'
Murdoch's case:3
'The main items to be taken into account in valuing shares are the 
earning powers of the company and the safety of the capital assets in 
which the shareholders' money is invested.'
The valuer should not lose sight, however, that the basis of valuation must 
depend on the circumstances. This point was considered where valuable 
farmland had been transfered to a fanning company in M'Connel's Trustees v 
IRC4, it was stated by lord Flemming:
'The petitioners found upon the fact that for each of the three years 
after its formation the company made a loss and they say there was never 
any prospect of the company earning profits or being in a position to pay
2 (1944) 70 CLR 23 at 42
3 (1942) 65 CLR 573 at 58(1
4 (1927) ?LT 14 at 15
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a dividend. They maintained that the saares must be valued on the 
footing that the company is a going concern, and with references to the 
provisions of the memorandum and articles of association and also to the
past history and future prospects of the company, from a dividend earning 
point of view. These are all circumstances which fall to be taken into 
account, but in my opinion they are by no means the only factors in the 
calculation. A share in a limited company gives the holder a right, not 
only to participate in the division of the profits, but also to 
participate in the division of the capital. ... A purchaser of the shares 
buying them as an ordinary investment and considering what they were 
worth, would certainly have been influenced by the fact that the holder 
of these shares would be in a position to put the company into voluntary 
liquidation, and to realise the whole assets and divide the value thereof 
amongst the shareholders. Even if the shares are being sold in a number 
of different lots, 1 feel satisfied that the purchasers would all have 
given a price which was related to the capital value cf the undertaking 
on realisation. A purchaser of a small lot of the shares-would naturally 
'lave assumed that purchasers of the remaining share’s would wish to make 
the most they could out of their shares and would concur with him in 
taking the necessary steps to have the assets of the company realised to 
the best advantage.'
in that case the commissioners estimated the value of the net assets of the 
company, took 998 thousandths of that estimated value, as the deceased held 
993 shares out of a thousand, and deducted therefrom a reasonable sum to 
cover the estimated expenses of liquidating the company, Lord Fleming 
approved this method of valuation.
This case dealt »vith 99,8% of the shares but it will be noted that the judge
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ref erred to 'a purchaser of a small lot of shares' and his natural 
expectations. It is submitted that in any case in which there are valuable 
assets but no profit or any prospect of a profit, the break up value of the 
shares must be a factor in the valuation. The extent of the influence of 
that factor on the price must depend on the circumstances and in particular 
on the nature of the assets, the identity of other shareholders and the size 
of their holdings.
Where net asset backing is a subsidiary factor, as it is in most valuations, 
very rough approximations are made. In a typical case, net assets as shown 
by the latest balance sheet, would be adjusted by any undervaluation of 
properties, and intangibles would be eliminated. The valuer's routine 
annalysis of the balance sheet should provide him with enough information to 
make a rough calculation of net asset backing per share for most purposes.
It is worth remembering, however, that balance sheet or book values are 
irerely the amounts at which the company's assets happen to be recorded for 
accounting purposes. They are not necessarily market values. This is 
particularly true of fixed and non-current assets.
Occasionally the purchaser and vendor agree to be bound by an independent 
valuation of the company on a net assets basis. These full-scale asset 
valuations are often detailed lengthy exercises, in which independent 
professional valuations of all properties, plant and machinery and other 
fixed assets are commissioned. The parties might resort to this basis of 
valuation because it is thought to be less subjective and therefore less 
contentious than an earnings based valuation. But there is plenty of scope 
for differences of opinion in an assets based valuation. The professional 
valuation of Eised assets, for example, is dependent on tue assu'nptions used 
in the valuation. Thus, a valuation on an existing u • basis assuming 
adequate profitability may be considerably different from one based on 
actual profitability.
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A company's asset value also provides a useful comparison or cross-check 
against an earnings based valuation. If there is a substantial difference 
between the two figures, the valuer should satisfy himself that the 
implications of the difference accord with his own understanding of the 
company. For example, if the earnings based valuation is substantially 
below the asset value this may be because the company's management is poor 
and incapable of obtaining a proper rate of return on the assets; it may be 
because of depressed conditions in the industry - and it may of course be 
because the valuer has selected an inappropriate capitalisation rate!
CHAPTER 14
OTHER VALUATION METHODS
Although dividends, earnings and assets are widely ased as the basis for 
share valuations, other methods are also encountered from time to time.
This chapter briefly reviews four of these methods, namely, the discounted 
cash flow method, the super profits approach, the dual capitalisation method 
and miscellaneous formulae:
Discounted cash flow
Discounted cash flow techniques are commonly used in the appraisal of major 
capital expenditure. As the purchase of a company or a business is itself
usually a major investment, the DCF method is an obvious choice for 
appraising such an investment.
For a company, as for a capital project, the ’most important, and also the 
most difficult, task in the DCF exercise is the estimation of future cash 
flows. Cash flow for this purpose is not the popular conception of earnings 
plus non cash expenses such as depreciation, but a figure that reflects all 
cash inflows and outflows, including reciepts and expenditures that affect 
the balance sheet but not Hie profit and loss account. Outflows must 
therefore include repayment of loans, investments in fixed assets and 
additions to working capital. Cash inflows would include collection of 
debtors, sales of assets and reduction of net working capital. In addition, 
the valuer has to decide the number of years to cover in the analysis and 
how the terminal value of the osmpany is to be estimated.
Clearly, therefore, a DCF valuation is a major exercise in which company 
management must participate. Estimates will have to be prepared on slaes 
volume and sales price, raw materials cost, operating expenses and a host of 
other variables. All these variables have then to be co-ordinated into pro 
forma profit and loss accounts and balance sheets for each year to support
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the cash flow figures. The terminal value of the business may be estimated 
in a variety of ways. The most conservative would bs to assume liquidation 
of the business, unreal though this assumption is. Book net assets 
attributable to the equity, as shown in the pro forma balance sheet at the 
end of the discounting period, or the capitalised value of earnings or cash 
flow thereafter, may be used.
The DCF method is probably the most theoretically satisfying valuation 
technique for business acquisitions but it is not used as often as it should 
be because of obvious practical difficulties,, Few businessmen have much 
confidence in specific forecasts of result, ten years, or even five years 
ahead, and the evidence suggests that investing institutions are sceptical 
about numerical profit forecasts beyond two years. Given such doubts, it is 
hardly likely that the detailed, time-consuming and costly investigation 
necessary for DCF purposes would be seen as worthwile.' Furthermore, the 
notion of a finite life for the business is unreal, as is the notion that 
the value of the business ten or more years hence can be estimated with any 
degree of accuracy. The DCF method appears to bs popular where income or 
profits can be estimated with some confidence. It might, for instance, be 
used to value a ship-owning company whose vessels are the subject of 
long-term charter parties and financed mainly by borrowings. It could also 
be appropriate for a property company.
The DCF basis of valuation will not necessarily produce a market valuation. 
Because the discount rate is the buyer's required rate of return, and not 
necessarily the market r.=>te of return, the resultant figure will be the 
value to the particular buyer. It indicates the maximum price he should pay 
or if a vendor the minimum he should accept. An approximate idea of market 
value can be obtained by reference t-^ recent acquisitions of listed 
companies.
‘-.jpet i?Kit u..> p^tiLucn.‘‘ i
,ne supei profits approach i-tt, tmu1 jjeciigree and appears in
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fisc a.-' thf-r amount and duration of super profits. How is cne to know the 
-.oinci rAt!.- 1-o> '-ne purchase of super profits? This valuation basis leads to 
Tiqhlv s^oi-ei •!' ;!ii:.:sumenrs divorced from reality.
■J‘Jd.1 Japi'i Vi/. * 9af. .
‘'he dual capitalj * “H.ion technique takes into account the earnings and the 
"isset.?' r.i tPt cn'ipany being valued. An earnings-based valuation is carried 
.■I"' ..ti-jitc1 J iisinu utaintainahle profits using an acceptable rate of return 
‘iii' Hie. ,ie!: ' arsaibl;""* asset- are- "alued on a going concern basis. The mean of 
«iys>- f-.wc- ^ajyss !.r tnen taken. This averaging method is n^t inspired by 
«!>• i-her<tv• ft -- -nmply a 'TxnDromi.st* which may provi.de a practical solution
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if the bargaining parties cannot agree n the basis of valuation.
Ai& ellaneous Formulae
In certain types of business, generally small personally managed firms, it 
may be customary to value on some rule-of thumb formula. Thus, one may find
that a small retail business in a particular line of trade might be valued 
at x times the sales plus stock at valuation. Professional practices 
sometimes charge hands on a multiple of gross fees. Despite their lack of 
proper theoretical justification such formulae can serve a useful purpose as 
a guide to value where the financial statements are unreliable or 
non-existent.
These formulae should -.oc be used to value professionally managed companies 
where adequate financial information is available for valuing the business 
by reference to expected future returns. These formulae are, nevertheless, 
encountered occasionally in the valuation of substantial businesses. For 
example, fund management companies are frequently valued on a percentage of 
funds under management basis. Such a basis makes no distinction between a 
well managed fund and a poorly managed fund. Where this type of formula is 
customary, it should never be used in isolation; the conventional method
i.e. one which assesses the return on the investment should always be used 
as well.
CHAPTER 15
CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE VALUATION BASIS
There are three approaches to the valuation cf dhares - dividends, earnings 
and assets. In a particular valuation, one, two or all three approaches may 
bi used. They are in fact related to each other in the sense that dividends 
are a function of earnings, earning power is the basis of asset values and 
the assets themselves affect earning power. However, a dividend approach 
will generally produce a different valuation to an earnings approach, and 
the asset value approach will normally produce a valuation different from 
either of the other two. It is therefore a matter of considerable 
practical, as well as theoretical, interest as to which basis should be used 
in a given set of circumstances.
Perhaps it is appropriate to start by recording the measure of agreement 
amongst the experts, When a controlling shareholding is being valued, 
almost everyone agrees that the dividend basis is inappropriate. A 
controlling shareholding is generally valued on an earnings basis, usually 
accottpanied by an appraisal of asset backing. Sometimes the asset value 
alone might be used. The discounted cash flow basis, which is theoretically 
more satisfying than the earnings basis requires a lot of time and suffers 
from certain practical difficulties. It is particular]y t.-aitable where 
income and expenditure can be projected into the future with some certainty.
As regard minority shareholdings there appears to be seme difference of 
opinion as to the appropriate valuation basis, although, a few notable 
exceptions (e.g. property companies) most practitioners would agree that the 
assets basis alone is not suitable. The disagreements tend to arise as to 
whether dividends or earnings should be used for valuing minority 
shareholdings.
The question of the relative importance of dividends and earnings in the 
determination of the share prices of listed companies has been the subject 
of a lively academic debate for sane years. Miller and Modigliani could be 
considered as the champions of the view that a company1s dividend policy has
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no effect on the value of its shares. For MM 'values ... are determined 
solely by 1 real1 consideration - in this case the earning power of the 
firm's assets and its investment policy - and not by how the fruits of the 
earning power are 'packaged' for distribution.
Myron Gordon, on the other hand takes the view that a company's share price 
is not independent of the dividend rate. He believes that investors value a 
dollar of profits paid out in dividends more highly than a dollar of profits 
retained in the business. He acknowledges that a low payout ratio today 
should result in increased dividends later on and that the present value of 
the future increase in dividends should equal the value of the dividends 
foregone nov , assuming an ideal world of constant rates of return on capital 
and a discount rate equal to the rate of return. However, Gordon maintains 
that in the real world of uncertainty the investor will view the more 
distant distributions as riskier than the nearer ones and will accordingly 
dicount the former at a higher rate than the latter. If the single figure 
discount rate which equates future dividends to the price of a share is seen 
as the weighted average of different discount rates applied to different 
year's distributions this average will rise, and share prices therefore will 
fall, and the time pattern of future dividends cte.nges from the near to the 
more distant future. Increasing or reducing the dividend therefore affects 
the share price.
Space does not allow us to go into the pros and cons of this dispute nor is 
it necessary for the purpose in hand. Both Gordon and MM and no doubt all 
theorists and practitioners in the field of finance agree that the return on 
an investment in shares consists of dividends received plus any profit or 
minus any loss on eventual sale. It is clear from that discussion that the 
purchaser of a minority shareholding in an unlisted company is generally 
locked into his investment. If we ignore for the moment the special cases 
of those companies which are likely to be taken over or are likely to obtain 
a Stock Exchange listing for their shares, it is clear that the purchaser of 
a minority shareholding in an unlisted company will find it very difficult 
to sell his shares and if the Articles have fair value pre-emption clauses,
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the price at which he sells could well be outside his control.
No one enters into such an arrangement other than on the understanding that 
it is of a long-term nature. This means that the proportion of the total 
return that is accounted for by dividend*- will be much larger in an 
investment in unlisted shares than it is in listed shares. Furthermore, the 
capital gain element of the total return will typically not be realised 
until after many years - 10 years would not be an unusual time span for an 
unlisted investmentIf we accept Gordon's logical assertion that higher 
discount rates are appropriate for the more distant, i.e. more uncertain, 
cash flows, the significance of the terminal value to the total return is 
further diminished.
Dividends, therefore, loan much larger in the return on unlisted shares than 
they do on listed shares (looked at from the viewpoint of an individual 
investor), and consequently one would expect a greater emphasis on dividends 
in the valuation of unlisted shares. This statement holds irrespective of 
the basis on which the terminal value is arrived at. In practice, the 
eventual prospective buyer, again say 10 years hence, will be in the saute 
position as the current purchaser, and a significant part of his future 
return, and therefore of the value at the date of his purchase, will be 
represented by dividends. Today's purchaser, therefore, should value his 
shares purely on the dividend stream.
If a minority shareholding is valued on a earnings basis i.e. if earnings 
are seen as the return on the investment, the purchaser will pay a 
significantly higher price; for earnings exceed dividends often by a factor 
of three or more to one. The stream of dividends - again let us say for 10 
years - will i.epresent an inadequate return on their own, and the price can 
only be justified on the assumption of a substantial capital gain on 
eventual sale. If we continue to ignore the special cases of a company 
which is likely to obtain a listing and one which is 'bid-prone', it must be 
folly indeed to pin one's hopes for an adequate retun on the occurrence of 
an event so far into the future and in all the circumstances of such
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questionable probability. The whcle basis of such an investment is the 
improbable assumption that the unmarketable will prove marketable. The 
fallacy of the earnings approach has been summed up by John Burr Williams in 
a classic text, "The Theory of Investment value":
'Earnings are only a means to an end, and the means should net be 
mistaken for the end. Therefore, we must say that a stock derives its 
value frcm its dividends, and not its earnings, in short, a stock is 
worth only what you can get out of it.1
In those exceptional cases where a company is likely to be taken over or to 
secure a listing for its shares different considerations apply. In both 
these cases the terminal value or sale proceeds will generally be much 
higher than the ordinary minority price. This is because the discount for 
lack of marketability will no longer be appropriate and, in the case of a 
takeover, the price will reflect a premium for control. Furthermore, the 
investor who buys on the expectation of a listing or a takeover will not 
expect to be locked in to his investment indefinitely. For the takeover or 
listing to be foreseeable it must presumable be within two or three years of 
the present time. In these two special situations the shares should be 
valued on the expectation of a listing or a takeover, as appropriate, with a 
suitable discount for uncertainty and waiting time. Dividends likely to be 
received in the intervening period should also be taken into account.
A recurrent theme of this paper has been the danger of'relying on the 
balance sheet amounts of net assets often mistakenly terms 'values', and the 
pitfalls of looking at such assets 'values' in isolation from earnings 
potential. The assets basis alone should be used only to value companies 
which have readily realisable assets with a value independent of the 
business. Property companies, investment trusts and ship-owning companies 
and, of course, companies in liquidation are examples of business which 
might well be valued on this basis. Nevertheless the value of small 
minority holdings in such companies other than those in liquidation should 
always be justifiable in terms of the dividend yield since barring a
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take-over or possibly a listing the only way those assets are likely to 
represent a cash return to the minority shareholder is in the form of future 
dividends. A review of the asset Backing, as distinct from the direct 
derivation of a share's value from the value of the underlying assets, is an 
essential element in all share valuations. High asset backing indicates a 
more secure investment and calls for a higher capitalisation rate in both 
dividend and earnings based valuations.
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